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Abstract
Essays on Bundling and A La Carte Pricing in a Two-Sided Model
Minghua Chen
Advisor: Konstantinos Serfes Ph.D.
My dissertation examines the profitability of bundling and the impact of an a la carte
regulation in a two-sided market. This is primarily motivated by the ongoing debate about
whether TV cable operators should be forced to offer TV channels on an a la carte basis, as
opposed to the current practice where only big bundles of channels are available for viewers.
My main contribution is that I formally incorporate the advertising side and I view each
TV network as a two-sided platform that wants to attract viewers and advertiser. The first
essay is theoretical, the second numerical and the third empirical.
In the first essay, I construct a theoretical model to analyze the incentive of a monopo-
list cable operator to bundle his products. The cable operator chooses how to offer the
TV channels to viewers: he can offer them separately (a la carte), together in a bundle
(pure bundling), or a combination of the two (mixed bundling). In a one-sided market, the
conventional finding is that mixed bundling is the weakly dominant strategy for a seller.
However, this may not hold in a two-sided market where the interplay between the two sides
(viewers and advertisers) creates new effects. In particular, mixed bundling can generate
higher levels of advertising, which hurts viewer and the profits of a monopolist and pure
bundling can strictly dominate mixed. Under a la carte pricing, the TV channels will lower
the advertising fees so that the advertising levels will be higher than under pure bundling.
All else equal, this makes viewers worse off but the monopolistic cable operator better off.
However, the cable operator will react by lowering the subscription fees, partially offsetting
the negative impact of advertising.
In the second essay, I conduct a numerical simulation by relaxing two assumptions made in
the first essay. First, viewer willingness to pay for the channels follows a bivariate normal
distribution. Second, the license fees are endogenously negotiated and determined by these
xtwo parties via Nash bargaining. I numerically simulate the equilibria of no bundling, mixed
bundling and pure bundling. I find that bundling flattens viewers’ demand, and enables
the monopolistic cable operator to extract more surplus from consumers. If the upstream
network and downstream cable operator are allowed to bilaterally negotiate the license fee,
license fees will be higher (lower) under pure bundling depending on whether cable operator
has mass (niche) market demand. Advertisement plays a very important role, by incorporat-
ing advertisement in our model, it is possible that pure bundling strictly dominates mixed
bundling.
In the third essay, I empirically estimate the viewers’ preference parameters, which give us
viewers’ dollar valuation for individual channels. I set up a structural model to test the
impact of an a la carte regulation in the cable TV industry. I formally model household
decision (regarding television-watching and cable package choices), cable operator pricing
decisions and television channel advertisement pricing decisions. In the estimation of house-
hold television-watching decision, I explicitly incorporate advertising in the utility function
and find that advertising levels bring negative utility to most of the consumers. I also esti-
mate the inverse demand for advertising on TV channels. Finally, I conduct a counterfactual
simulation to examine how an a la carte regulation will affect the industry.

11. Bundling and A La Carte Pricing in a Two-Sided Model
1.1 Introduction
We investigate a monopolist’s incentives to bundle his products and the welfare implica-
tions of an a la carte regulation in a two-sided market environment. Our paper is motivated
by the ongoing debate about whether the government (Federal Communications Commis-
sion, FCC) should regulate the TV industry and force cable and satellite operators to offer
channels a la carte. The TV industry is a typical two-sided market 1.
The TV networks target two different groups of agents simultaneously: advertisers and view-
ers. The higher the number of viewers a TV network has, the more attractive this network is
to advertisers. In contrast, advertisements impose a negative externality on viewers, because
they distract viewers from watching programs. A standard result in the bundling literature
in one-sided markets is that mixed bundling is a weakly dominant strategy for a monopolist.
We show that this may no longer be true in a two-sided market, as pure bundling can strictly
dominate mixed bundling. The reason is that the amount of advertising on each channel
depends on how the monopolist offers his products. Pure bundling results in less advertising
which makes consumers better off and allows the monopolist to increase his profits (relative
to mixed bundling). This may explain why pure bundling is the predominant method cable
operators use to package TV channels, a prediction that a one-sided model cannot deliver.
Moreover, and since mixed bundling can be used to sort consumers and extract more surplus,
an a la carte regulation benefits consumers in a one-sided market environment. However,
in a two-sided market model consumers may be worse off following an a la carte regulation,
because the level of advertising may increase.
Cable prices, whether on an unadjusted or quality-adjusted basis, have been rising faster
than inflation. Crawford et al. (2008), report that unadjusted cable prices increased by
84.1% over 1997-2005, while the increase was 50.5% when adjusted for quality improve-
1Examples of other two-sided markets can be found in Rochet and Tirole (2003)
2ments. In the same period, the increase in the CPI was only 18.8%. Consumer groups and
politicians assert that the bundling practices by cable TV providers have contributed to
the steep price increases. By contrast, cable interest groups oppose the idea of a la carte
pricing. They argue that bundling lowers transaction costs, realizes economies of scale and
simplifies consumers’ decision-making process, and a la carte pricing will hurt consumers
by driving up prices. The attitude of the FCC about a la carte pricing is ambiguous. The
FCC has published two reports on a la carte pricing. In the November 2004 report, they
concluded that a la carte pricing would result in higher prices and thus provide little benefit
to consumers. However, in the February 2006 report, their conclusion is the opposite from
the previous one.
The model we develop can be used to inform policy makers about the welfare properties of
a la carte pricing in the TV industry. Our contribution is that we formally incorporate the
advertising side and we investigate the impact of advertising on the incentives to bundle
and the welfare implications of an a la carte regulation (more details about how our paper
is positioned in the literature are offered in the literature review section). This yields new
and interesting insights.
More specifically, our model consists of two upstream TV networks and a downstream
monopoly cable operator. The TV networks compete via advertising fees to attract ad-
vertisers, and sell their contents to the downstream monopolist. The monopolist chooses
how to offer the TV channels to viewers. He can offer the TV channels separately (a la carte),
together in a bundle (pure bundling) or the combination of the two (mixed bundling). View-
ers dislike advertisements but advertisers benefit if the number of viewers on a TV channel
is higher. The monopolist, by committing to offering the TV channels as a pure bundle2
before the TV networks compete for advertisers, is able to influence the demand functions
for advertising the TV networks are facing. In particular, competition between the two TV
networks for advertisers softens under pure bundling, resulting in higher advertising fees and
2In the literature on the bundling, a number of papers allow firms to commit to a particular bundling
strategy prior to their choices of actual prices, e.g. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989).
In this paper, the stage of cable operator to commit to the bundle strategy before TV networks set the
advertisement fees is very important. Without this stage and taking the advertising levels as given, mixed
bundling is always a weakly dominant strategy for the monopolist cable operator.
3less advertising.
This works as follows. There are two opposing effects on the (inverse) demand curve for ad-
vertising when the downstream monopolist switches from mixed bundling to pure bundling:
i) a slope effect and ii) a location effect. The slope effect refers to the fact that the demand
curve becomes steeper (less elastic), which implies higher equilibrium advertising fees and
less advertising. The location effect refers to the demand curve shifting out, which implies
more advertising. The slope effect dominates the location effect in our model and as a con-
sequence the amount of advertising is less under pure bundling than under mixed bundling.
This increases the viewers’ willingness to pay and consequently increases the profitability of
pure bundling for the monopolist, relative to mixed bundling.
To better understand the slope effect, suppose that the amount of advertising on one chan-
nel, say ESPN, decreases. Viewers of ESPN are now willing to pay more and the monopolist
responds by raising his subscription fees. The key idea is that the monopolist, due to the
lack of pricing flexibility when he only offers the bundle, is more ‘cautious’ in raising his
subscription fee to consumers (viewers) under pure bundling. After all, the bundle is also
purchased by people who do not watch ESPN and therefore have received no benefit from
the reduction in the amount of advertising. Being more cautious implies that fewer viewers
are lost when the monopolist raises his subscription fee under pure bundling than under
mixed bundling, which in turn implies stronger demand for advertising slots (because there
are more viewers). Hence, a TV channel looses fewer advertisers if it unilaterally raises its
advertising fee under pure bundling than under mixed bundling and that is why the slope
of the demand curve is steeper. (An intuition for the location effect and further discussion
on these two effects are offered in section 1.4.1).
The implication of advertising for an a la carte regulation is important. As we mentioned
above, an a la carte regulation intensifies the competition among TV networks for adver-
tisers and lowers the advertising fees which implies more advertisements than under pure
bundling. All else equal, this will make viewers worse off. However, the monopolist will react
by lowering the subscription fees, partially offsetting the negative impact of advertising.
4Our results show that an a la carte regulation makes the cable operator worse off. This
finding is consistent with the fact that most cable operators are opposing such regulation.
The effect of a la carte pricing on consumer surplus is ambiguous. When the unregulated
equilibrium is characterized by mixed bundling, viewers become better off from an a la carte
regulation. Nevertheless, if the unregulated equilibrium is pure bundling, consumers can be
either better off or worse off.
Our model is not specific to the TV industry and it can be applied to other markets that
have similar features, e.g., newspapers, credit cards etc. The negative externality one side
(advertisers) imposes on the other (viewers) is not crucial for our results. Our main insights
continue to hold even when we assume positive externalities on both sides. One of our
paper’s main points is that the interaction between the two sides affects the profitability of
bundling by influencing the amount of advertising. Basically, pure bundling helps to reduce
the amount of the negative externality. In a model with positive externalities on both sides
(e.g., newspapers where ads are beneficial to the readers, such as coupons, job listings etc.)
pure bundling increases the amount of the positive externality, i.e., more advertising in that
setting, making the monopolist better off.
1.1.1 Literature review
Broadly speaking, our paper is related to three different strands of literature: i) bundling,
ii) two-sided markets and iii) a la carte pricing.
Firstly, the bundling literature has been traditionally developed under the one-sided market
framework. While this is the obvious first step, the predictions of the existing literature
cannot be extended straightforwardly to two-sided models3. Bundling reduces the hetero-
geneity of consumer valuations and it is a useful tool of price discrimination. Under a
monopoly setting, pure bundling and no bundling can be considered as two special cases of
mixed bundling. Schmalensee (1984) and McAfee et al. (1989) show that mixed bundling
is a weakly dominant strategy, while as we show this is not necessarily true in a two-sided
market.
3Stole (2007) and Kobayashi (2005) offer excellent surveys of the bundling literature.
5Secondly, two-sided markets have recently attracted significant attention. In a two-sided
market, platforms compete to attract agents from different groups (e.g., Caillaud and Julien
(2003) and Armstrong (2006)). A main goal is to show how the composition of the aggregate
price affects the volume of trade (Rochet and Tirole (2006)). Choi (2006) shows that tying
can be welfare enhancing in a two-sided market where multihoming is allowed. Anderson
and Coate (2005) models media advertising market as a two-sided market, where the number
of viewers has a positive externality to advertising level, but viewers dislike advertisement
because it shortens the time for the content of the program. Nevertheless, to the best of our
knowledge, no paper has examined the profitability of bundling and the a la carte implica-
tions in a two-sided framework.
Finally, there is some theoretical and empirical work that tries to evaluate the consequences
of an a la carte regulation. On a theoretical level, Rennhoff and Serfes (2009) investigate the
incentives to bundle and the a la carte implications in an upstream-downstream oligopolistic
framework. Crawford and Cullen (2007), by conducting a numerical analysis, predict that
consumers can benefit from a la carte pricing. However, in those papers the advertising
side is not modeled. On an empirical level there are the papers by Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2008), Dmitri (2008) and Rennhoff and Serfes (2008) who address the issue of a la carte
pricing in the TV cable industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The main model is presented in section
1.2. A benchmark one-sided model is presented in section 1.3. The main analysis of the
two-sided model is provided in section 1.4. The a la carte scenario is analyzed in section
1.5. Some robustness checks are performed in section 1.6. We conclude in section 1.7. All
proofs are in the appendix.
1.2 The model
≺ figure C.1 
Our model features four types of players (see also figure C.1): viewers, a monopolist
downstream cable operator, two competing upstream TV networks (platforms), and adver-
6tisers. Below, we explain the role of each group of players in more detail.
1.2.1 TV Networks
There are two TV stations (networks) indexed by a and b, such as CNN and ESPN.
Each network can be viewed as a platform that has to attract both viewers and advertisers.
On the one hand, networks sell their programs to the cable operator by charging a license
fee. On the other hand, they sell advertising slots to the advertisers. Therefore, their profits
are composed of two parts: the license fee from the cable operator and the profit from
advertisement. For simplification, and in order to better focus on the effect of advertising,
we assume that the license fee is equal to zero.
1.2.2 Monopolist cable operator
There is a monopolist cable operator, taking Comcast as an example, which buys the
programs from the networks and sells them to the viewers. If there is no a la carte regulation,
the cable operator can choose to offer the two channels in one of the following three different
ways: i) each channel is offered separately at one stand-alone price, pa and pb (defined as
”no bundling” NB strategy), ii) the two channels are offered separately and together as a
bundle with the bundle price pB being lower than the sum of the two stand-alone prices
(defined as ”mixed bundling” MB strategy) and iii) both channels are offered together as a
bundle (defined as ”pure bundling” PB strategy).
1.2.3 Viewers (consumers)
There are three types of viewers: those with demands only for one channel, either a
or b and those with demands for both channels. Type a and type b viewers are called
single demand viewers, and type B viewers are the multiple (double) demand viewers. For
example, households with many members can be viewed as multiple demand viewers, while
smaller households can be viewed as single demand viewers. Type a viewers’ best choice is
channel a when the stand-alone price for a is available. Similarly, type b viewers’ best choice
7is network b. There is a continuum of viewers in each group. The maximum willingness to
pay of the single demand viewers is uniformly distributed in [0,1] and that of the multiple
demand viewers is uniformly distributed in [0,V], with V = 2.
Viewers purchase TV networks from the cable operator where the programs are accompanied
with advertisements. We assume that viewers are advertisement adverse, or in other words,
advertisements impose a negative utility on viewers.4. Let t represent the per-unit nuisance
cost of advertisements impose and αi denote the amount of advertising on channel i, i=a,b.
Viewers will subscribe to their favorite network(s) as far as their net utility is non-negative.
Therefore, the demand functions of each group are given as follows
da = 1− tαa − pa
db = 1− tαb − pb
dB = V − t(αa + αb)− pB .
When the cable operator offers only the bundle, then the single demand viewers purchase the
bundle, pay the bundle price pB and watch only their favorite channel, as long as their net
utility is nonnegative. Therefore, the advertisements on the other network will not generate
any nuisance cost to them. Multiple demand viewers will form the bundle by themselves if
the bundle is not available.
1.2.4 Advertisers
We assume that platforms produce TV programs accompanied with certain amount of
advertisements. We assume that there is a continuum of advertisers with different will-
ingnesses to pay. Moreover, advertisers are willing to pay a higher advertisement fee gi if
network i has attracted more viewers. We denote by Di = di + dB , i = a, b, the aggregate
number of viewers channel i has attracted. Note here that our implicit assumption is that
4Wilbur (2008) empirically found that television advertising will cause audience losses. Based on his
empirical test, 10% decrease in advertising level will increase audience size by 25%
8advertisers value single demand viewers the same as multiple demand viewers. The total
number of viewers on a channel depends on the amount of advertising on both channels,
Di(αa, αb). This is because αb, for instance, affects the number of multiple demand viewers
which in turn affects the number of viewers on channel a. Therefore, the aggregate (inverse)
demand functions of advertisers are given by
αa = Da(αa, αb)− ga
αb = Db(αa, αb)− gb
An increase in the advertising fee, say ga, impacts αa directly and indirectly through
Da(αa, αb). The direct effect is obvious. Let’s elaborate a bit more on the indirect effect.
If αa falls the number of people who watch channel a will also be affected, which in turn
affects the demand for advertising slots.
We will analyze the following three-stage game.
• Stage 1: The cable operator announces what package he will offer, i.e., pure bundle,
mixed bundle or no bundle.
• Stage 2: The TV networks simultaneously choose advertisement fees, ga and gb.
• Stage 3: The cable operator sets prices, pi.
We will search for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.3 Benchmark: equilibrium in a one-sided model (no advertising)
In order to better evaluate the impact of advertising on the monopolist’s incentives to
bundle and on the welfare implications of an a la carte regulation, we first find the equilibrium
in a one-sided model with no advertising. The proposition below summarizes the result.
Proposition 1. The downstream monopolist’s optimal strategy is to offer the mixed bundle
9(MB). The subscription fees are given by
pOMBB =
V
2
, pOMBa =
1
2
, andpOMBb =
1
2
.
The monopolist’s profit is given by
pOMB =
V 2
4
+
1
2
.
The above result is consistent with the literature on bundling where mixed bundling
is a weakly dominant strategy for a monopolist, e.g., Schmalensee (1984) and McAfee,
et.al (1989). By offering the mixed bundle the monopolist is able to sort the viewers and
price discriminate. The viewers with multiple demands pay a lower per-channel price than
the price the viewers with single demand pay. Not surprisingly, this flexibility boosts the
monopolist’s profit. The consumer (viewer) surplus is given by
CSOMB =
V 2
8
+
1
4
.
Let’s now consider an a la carte regulation that forces the monopolist to break the bundle
and charge two stand-alone prices, no bundling NB. The cable operator serves all three
groups of viewers, with the equilibrium prices given by
pONBa = p
ONB
b =
V
6
+
1
6
.
The consumer surplus under an a la carte regulation is
CSONB =
V 2
4
− V
2
+
3
4
.
It can be easily calculated that CSOMB − CSONB = − (V−2)28 , suggesting that such a
regulation enhances consumer welfare. Under mixed bundling, the monopolist can afford
to charge relatively high prices to the single demand viewers and offer a discount to the
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multiple demand viewers. However, under an a la carte regulation this strategy is no longer
viable. In order to attract more multiple demand viewers the monopolist lowers all prices,
benefiting the viewers (on average).
1.4 Analysis of the main two-sided model
We now analyze the two-sided model. The next proposition summarizes the SPNE of
this game when the viewer disutility from advertising is not too high, i.e., t=2.3.5
Proposition 2. (Bundling is allowed). There are two types of equilibria: a pure bundling
PB equilibrium and a mixed bundling MB equilibrium that are described as follows.
• Pure Bundling (PB). If 0 ≤ V ≤ V1,6
the cable operator offers only the bundle. Subscription fees and the cable operator’s
profits are given by
pPBB =
18t2 + t2V + 30t+ 9tV + 6V + 12
2(5t+ 3)(6 + 7t)
piPB =
3(18t3 + t2V + 30t+ 9tV + 6V + 12)2
4(5t+ 3)2(6 + 7t)2
.
Advertisement levels and TV networks’ profits are given by,
αPBa = α
PB
b =
(2V + 1)(4t+ 3)
(5t+ 3)(6 + 7t)
ϕPBa = ϕ
PB
b =
(2V + 1)2(t+ 1)(4t+ 3)
(5t+ 3)(6 + 7t)2
.
• Mixed Bundling (MB). If V1 < V = 2, the cable operator offers the mixed bundle.
52.3 is the necessary condition for the existence of MB equilibrium.
6Where V1 is given by
V 1 = (1103120t5 + 69120t+ 31587t8 + 658577t6 + 6912 + 743760t3 + 220656t7 + 300960t2 + 1138620t4
+2t(6 + 7t)(4 + 3t)(5t+ 3)(324t5 + 1845t4 + 3876t3 + 38782 + 1884t+ 360)
1
2 (3t+ 2)
3
2
/(294336t2 + 697440t3 + 69120t+ 904204t5 + 495367t6 + 151782t7 + 20091t8 + 1005836t4 + 6912).
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Subscription fees and the cable operator’s profits in this sub-game are given by,
pMBB =
5t2V − 4t2 + 14tV − 4t+ 8V
2(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
pMBa = p
MB
b =
−(−7t2 + 2t2V − 16t+ 2tV − 8)
2(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
piMB =
1
4(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
(114t4 + 33t4V 2 − 96t4V − 336t3V + 156t3V 2 + 480t3 + 284t2V 2
+752t2 − 368t2V − 128tV + 224tV 2 + 512t+ 128 + 64V 2).
Advertisement levels and TV networks’ profits are given by,
αMBa = α
MB
b =
(2(1 + t)(1 + V )
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
ϕMBa = ϕ
MB
b =
(t+ 2)(1 + V )2(1 + t)
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)2
.
1.4.1 Discussion of the equilibrium
The most interesting result in Proposition 2 is that, contrary to the prediction from a
one-sided model, pure bundling can strictly dominate mixed bundling for the downstream
monopolist. This happens when the maximum willingness to pay of the multiple demand
group V is not too high, i.e., V = V1. There are two effects associated with the monopolist’s
decision about how to offer the two products (channels): A pricing effect and an advertising
effect. The pricing effect refers to the monopolist’s ability to use the product offerings as
a way to extract more surplus from the consumers. In particular, as we have discussed
above, mixed bundling sorts viewers according to their preferences and hence enhances the
monopolist’s profits. The advertising effect emerges from the two-sided nature of the market
and it refers to how the amount of advertising on each channel is affected by the product
offerings. As we will discuss in more detail later, mixed bundling attracts more advertisers,
in equilibrium, than pure bundling. This lowers the viewers’ willingness to pay for the
12
mixed bundle and consequently the monopolist’s profits. Therefore, when the advertising
effect is stronger than the pricing effect, pure bundling is the strictly dominant strategy for
the monopolist.
Viewer side
In the pure bundling equilibrium, the price increases as V increases. In the mixed
bundling equilibrium, the price of the bundle increases as V increases, while the stand-alone
prices are decreasing in V . In contrast, in a one-sided market the equilibrium stand-alone
prices do not depend on V see Proposition 1. This can be understood as follows. When V
increases, more multiple demand viewers purchase the bundle. This attracts more advertisers
and the level of advertising increases on both channels, which in turn imposes a disutility
on the small demand viewers who are now willing to pay less.
≺ figure C.2 
The number of viewers the cable operator will serve in each group is shown in figure C.2.
We can see that in both equilibria, the viewers in the multiple demand group increase
as the maximum-willingness-to-pay increases, while the viewers in single demand groups
decreases. In the PB case, when V increases, the cable operator will set a higher price
which will reduce the quantity demanded in the single demand groups. In the MB case, the
maximum-willingness-to-pay of the multiple demand group viewers can affect the demand
of the single demand groups viewers even though the cable operator price discriminates and
charges different prices among the three groups. It is because of the cross-group externality,
as we have argued above. The cable operator serves more viewers in the multiple demand
group but fewer in the single demand group, relative to the PB case.
≺ figure C.3 
Advertising side
In both equilibria, the advertising levels are increasing as V increases. The advertising
level jumps up when we move from PB to MB equilibrium. This result is associated with the
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positive externality of viewers to advertisers and the negative externality of advertisements
to viewers. Let Da represent the total number of viewers network a has in the equilibrium,
and Da is a function of aa and ab.
DMBa = d
MB
a + d
MB
B =
1
2
+
V
2
− tαMBa −
tαMBb
2
(1.1)
DPBa = d
PB
a + d
PB
B =
1
3
+
2V
3
− 4tα
PB
a
3
− tα
PB
b
3
. (1.2)
We have assumed that the demand function for advertising is αi = Di(αi, αj) − gi. After
substituting Di, we know that in the equilibrium the demand functions of advertising are
functions of ga and gb,
αa = Da(αa(ga, gb), αb(ga, gb))− ga (1.3)
αb = Db(αa(ga, gb), αb(ga, gb))− gb. (1.4)
We solve the system of equations represented by equations (1.3) and (1.4) with respect to ga
and gb in order to derive the demand functions for advertising explicitly. These are given in
equatoins (A.3) and (A.3.2) in the Appendix. We can verify that the inverse demand curves
are steeper in the PB subgame than in the MB subgame.7
This implies higher equilibrium advertising fees and less advertising in PB than in MB.
The intuition is as follows. Fix the levels of advertising and the advertising fees at the
equilibrium levels under MB. Now allow the monopolist to change to PB, but force the
new inverse demand curves to pass through the equilibrium under MB. The inverse demand
curves under PB are steeper. We term this the slope effect. As an example, suppose that
the two TV networks are CNN and ESPN. Assume that ESPN increases its advertising fee.
This will have two effects on the level of advertising: i) a direct effect and ii) an indirect effect.
The direct effect, which is the same in both MB and PB, reduces the quantity demanded for
advertising (negative effect). Consequently, there will be fewer ads on ESPN. The indirect
effect has to do with the fact that, in a two-sided market, fewer ads imply lower viewer
7See the Appendix.
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disutility from advertisements and hence stronger viewer demand for TV networks (higher
viewer willingness to pay). This attracts more viewers which increases the demand for
advertising, partially offsetting the initial decrease due to the direct effect (positive effect).
The positive effect is stronger in PB than in MB. We can explain this as follows.8
Under mixed bundling, the monopolist operator, in an attempt to appropriate part of the
viewers’ higher willingness to pay due to less advertising, will increase the subscription fees
of ESPN and the bundle (ESPN+CNN). He will not, however, change the subscription fee
of CNN, because the level of advertising on CNN has not changed. The strength of the
positive effect is reduced. On the other hand, under pure bundling, the monopolist operator
has less freedom in setting his subscription fees. He will be more cautious (compared to MB)
in raising the subscription fee, because the bundle is now purchased by all viewers, including
those who only like CNN. As a result, the positive effect is reduced less in PB than in MB.
Putting the negative (direct) effect together with the positive (indirect) effect of an increase
of ESPN’s advertising fee, we can conclude that the decrease in the quantity demanded of
advertising on ESPN is larger under MB than under PB. This implies a steeper slope of the
inverse demand function for advertising under MB.
For the slope effect we forced the inverse demand curve under PB to pass through the
equilibrium point under MB. Now we allow the location to adjust, following a transition
from MB to PB, location effect. From the slope effect we know that when the monopolist
switches from MB to PB, there will be less advertising on both TV channels. Less advertising
on the rival channel, say CNN, implies higher viewer utility and stronger demand. The
monopolist will increase his subscription fee, but given the constraints he faces, he will not
completely offset the advertising benefit. As a result the number of multiple demand viewers
increases.9This increases the demand for advertising on ESPN and shifts the inverse demand
8There is also a minor effect that advertising fee affects the advertising level. The decreases of αa will
make the number of viewers of the rival goes up, and in turn increase the rival’s advertising level, αb.
Furthermore, the increase of αb will lower the number of viewers of channel a and thus lower the demand
for advertisement on channel a. This effect is strictly dominated, therefore, we just omit the discussion here.
The complete discussion can be found in Appendix.
9More formally, this can be seen by comparing the equilibrium prices under the two regimes as given by
equations (A.5) and (A.1) and the number of viewers as given by equations (A.6) and (A.2). When both
αa and αb decrease the monopolist under MB increases his price by t exactly offsetting the benefit from the
reduction in advertising. Under PB, however, the price increases by a fraction of t and hence the number of
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curve out. The location effect implies higher advertising fee and higher levels of advertising.
In our model, the slope effect dominates the location effect and therefore the net result is
less advertising in equilibrium (and higher advertising fees) under PB.
≺ figure C.4 
≺ figure C.5 
1.4.2 Consumer surplus when bundle is allowed
In this section, we compute the consumer surplus when bundling is allowed. Since we
assume that the demand functions are linear, the consumer surplus can be easily found as
follows:
CS =
(V − tαa − tαb − pB)2
2
+
(1− tαa − pa)2
2
+
(1− tαb − pb)2
2
In the PB equilibrium, the consumer surplus is given by,
CSPB =
3
8(5t+ 3)2(6 + 7t)2
(−1836t4V + 1676t4 + 649t4V 2 − 5328V t3 + 2178t3V 2 + 4824t3
+432 + 2757t2V 2 + 5172t2 − 5652t2V − 2592tV + 1548tV 2 + 2448t− 432V + 324V 2)
In the MB equilibrium, the consumer surplus is given by,
CSMB =
1
8(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
(33V 2t4 + 114t4 − 96V t4 + 156V 2t3 + 480t3 − 336V t3
+284t2V 2 + 752t2 − 368t2V − 128tV + 224tV 2 + 512t+ 128 + 64V 2)
The following depicts the relationship between consumer surplus and V,
≺ figure C.6 
In general, MB generates less consumer surplus than PB because MB allows the cable opera-
tor to price discriminate among the three groups and extract a larger surplus. Furthermore,
multiple demand viewers increases under PB.
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there are more ads under the MB equilibrium than under the PB equilibrium. Both the
price and advertising effect make consumer surplus be lower under the MB equilibrium.
1.5 A la carte pricing (bundling is not allowed)
Now, we assume that a regulator forces the downstream monopolist to sell his products
separately (a la carte). The next proposition summarizes the SPNE of this game when
0 ≤ V ≤ 2.
Proposition 3. There is one type of equilibrium: no bundling NB equilibrium that is de-
scribed as follows. The cable operator offers only stand alone prices which are relatively low
so that all three groups of viewers are served. Subscription fees and cable operator’s profits
in this sub-game are given by,
pNBa = p
NB
b =
(3t2 + 12t+ 8)(1 + V )
6(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
piNB =
(3t2 + 12t+ 8)2(1 + V )2
6(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
TV networks’ profits are given by,
αNBa = α
NB
b =
2(1 + V )(t+ 1)
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
ϕNBa = ϕ
NB
b =
(2 + t)(V + 1)2(t+ 1)
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)2
1.5.1 Profit comparisons with and without regulation
Combining the discussion in the previous two sections, we can compare cable operator’s
profits in the cases with and without regulation. When there is no regulation, cable operator
can choose from three pricing strategies: no bundling, mixed bundling and pure bundling
(when serving all three groups of viewers), to maximize its profits, while when there is
unbundling regulation, cable operator can only offer the stand-alone prices and have no
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bundling equilibrium. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand that cable operator can
get higher profits in the equilibria with no regulation.
1.5.2 Number of viewers comparison
≺ figure C.7 
Figure C.7 shows the comparison of the number of viewers in the equilibrium, the solid lines
measure the number of purchasing viewers when there is no regulation. The dash lines mea-
sure those when there is an unbundle regulation. When there is an unbundling regulation,
it will attract more lower demand groups viewers but fewer multiple demand group viewers.
This is consistent with one-sided market. In the equilibria, the equilibrium prices satisfy:
pMBa
2 ≺ pNBa ≺ pMBa and p
PB
B
2 ≺ pNBa ≺ pPBB ,therefore, no bundling equilibrium will attract
more viewers from small groups, but fewer viewers from multiple demand groups.
1.5.3 Advertisement level comparison
≺ figure C.8 
No bundling regulation will make TV networks allocate more (or at least the same) time slot
on advertisement than no regulation. It is interesting that the advertising level in MB case
is exactly the same as the one in NB case. It is because the demand functions (as functions
of αa and αb) are exactly the same as the functions in MB.
DNBa =
1
2
+
V
2
− tαa − 1
2
tαb
In MB case, cable operator can set different prices for each group. For any given advertising
level, the monopolist will set the prices so that the demand in multiple demand group
is: dMBB =
V−tαa−tαb
2 ), and the demand in small groups is: d
MB
i =
1−tαi
2 ,i = a and b.
Therefore, the total viewers of each network are: DMBi = d
MB
B + d
MB
i =
V+1−2tαi−tα−i
2 . In
NB case, cable operator can only set prices for each individual network, and here, we allow
the multiple demand group viewers to form their own bundle. For any given advertising level,
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cable operator will set the prices so that the demand in each groups is: dNBi =
5
6 − 12 tαi −
V
6 , i = a and b, d
NB
B =
2V
3 − 12 tαa− 12 tαb− 13 . NB tends to have more purchasing viewers from
small demand groups, while MB will have more purchasing viewers from multiple demand
group. The difference between the demands of single demand groups in NB case and MB
case is 13 − V6 in each group, while the difference in the demands of multiple demand group
is V6 − 13 . These two offset each other and the advertising demand functions will be the same
one in these two subgame
1.5.4 Welfare Comparison
In this section, we compare consumer surpluses with and without regulation. We still
start our analysis from the one-sided assumption. When there is no regulation, there is only
mixed bundling equilibrium and the consumer surplus from mixed bundling is as follows,
CSOMB =
V 2
8
+
1
4
.
The consumer surplus under an a la carte regulation is
CSONB =
V 2
4
− V
2
+
3
4
.
In mixed bundling, the monopolist has advantage in extracting the surplus from consumer
and yields lower consumer welfare, therefore, consumer can benefit from an a la carte pricing
regulation. Nevertheless, in the two-sided market, advertisement plays an important role on
consumer surplus. From figure C.9, we can see that the advertisement levels are higher under
a la carte pricing than under pure bundling. All else equal, this will make viewers worse off.
However, the monopolist will react by lowering the subscription fees. As we discussed in the
previous section, when αa and αb simultaneously increase, the monopolist has less freedom
in setting his subscription fees. It will be more cautious in lowering the subscription fees
under PB (the monopolist will lower the bundle price pB by
t
3 (αa + αb) under PB, and the
stand alone prices pi by
tαi
2 under a la carte pricing). Therefore, networks will lose more
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viewers from multiple demand groups and lose fewer from single demand groups under pure
bundling given the same amount of advertisement as a la carte pricing. The advertisement
acts to lower consumer welfare in both cases, but which case has relative higher effect is
ambiguous. When the unregulated outcome is MB equilibrium, the advertisement level is
exactly the same as NB case, so there is no advertisement effect here. By using MB strategy,
cable operator can extract as much surplus as possible from viewers, therefore the consumer
surplus from MB is much lower than the ones from NB and PB.
≺ figure C.9 
1.6 Robustness checks
In this section, we consider the robustness of our results under by loosing the assumption
of the independence of two advertisement markets.
1.6.1 The effects of substitution (complementary)
In the main model of this paper, we assume that the demand for the two networks
are not independent and allow for the competition between these two markets, that is, the
demand function of advertisement is αi = Di(αi, αj) − gi − ρgj , where ρ 6= 0. ρ represents
the degree of product differentiation, ranging from -1 (perfect substitutes) to +1 (perfect
complements). We believe that non-zero ρ will only quantitatively affect our result, but not
qualitatively. We have discussed when network a increases its advertising fee, it will decrease
its own advertising level directly. On the other hand, the decrease of the advertising level
will make the total number of viewers on this network goes up thus increase the demand for
advertisement and partially offset the direct effect. The non-zero ρ will only influence the
minor indirect effect. When two TV networks are complements to advertisers (ρ > 0), the
minor effect is soften. When two TV networks are substitutes (ρ < 0), the effect is enhanced.
However, in both cases, the minor indirect effect is dominated by the first two effects no
matter ρ is positive or negative, and we always have |∂aPBa
∂gPBa
| < |∂αMBa
∂gMBa
|, implying that the
inverse demand curve in PB subgame is steeper than in MB subgame which is the same as
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the case with ρ = 0. We compare the advertising levels in PB and MB subgames, and find
that αPB < αMB when ρ = −1,−0.5, 0.5 and 1, which is the same as the case where ρ = 0.
It is still possible that the advertising effect dominates the pricing effect, which will result
in PB equilibrium when there is no regulation. When the realized equilibrium is mixed
bundling when there is no regulation, consumers can be better off from the unbundling
regulation, but when the realized equilibrium is pure bundling equilibrium, the effect on
consumers is ambiguous.
1.6.2 Effects of marginal cost
In this section, we investigate how the non-zero license fees affect cable operator’s prof-
itability. The marginal cost will affect our result from two perspectives. First, the marginal
cost will drive the subscription fees up. Under PB, cable operator cannot distinct the view-
ers between the multiple demand group and single demand groups and need to pay both
license fees for all the viewers. Cable operator will lose a larger fraction of viewers from
small demand groups under PB than under MB or NB. Therefore, it is more difficult to be
profitable under PB with non-zero marginal cost. Actually, if there is only this effect, that
is, the story in one-sided market, mixed bundling is always preferred to pure bundling. The
second perspective plays an profound role. In the two-sided market, networks’ profits are
composed of two parts: the advertising revenue and the revenue from license fees. Networks
will maximize their total profit from advertisement and license fees, therefore, higher rev-
enue from license fees may affect their decision on the advertising fees and then the quantity
demanded for advertisement. Consequently, it will affect the demands of viewers, da, db
and dB and the profitability of the monopolist. First, We assume that the marginal costs
are exogeneous and the cable operator take them as given. The second perspective makes
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possible that pure bundling is strictly dominant to mixed bundling. 10
We also qualitatively analyze whether our results will still hold if we endogenize the marginal
costs. Instead of jumping directly to the very complicated and messy case that license fees
are determined by the bilateral bargain between the upstream and downstream firms, we
discuss the situation in which the license fees are offered in a ”take-it-or-leave-it” contract,
which can also provide us some insight on the effects endogeneous marginal costs. There
are two possible extreme cases: the upstream TV networks decide the license fees or the
downstream cable operator decides them. If the upstream TV networks have the power in
determining the license fees, the license fees tend to be high and it is difficult for PB to
strictly dominate MB. However, if the downstream firm has the power on license fees, the
optimal license fees for the downstream cable operator are zero. We already show in the
main model that when license fees are zero, it is possible that PB strictly dominates MB.
Therefore, we can conjecture that as the upstream TV networks have more power on the
determination of license fees, the license fees tend to be higher thus makes it more difficult
for PB to dominate MB.
1.7 Conclusion
We construct a two-sided market model to investigate the incentives of a downstream
TV cable operator to bundle TV channels and the welfare implications of a regulation that
forces the downstream firm to unbundle. We view each upstream TV network (channel) as
a two-sided platform that tries to attract advertisers and viewers. Advertisers prefer more
viewers, but viewers receive negative utility from advertisements. The upstream firms sell
their content to a downstream monopolist who packages them and offers them to viewers.
10If we assume the license fees r are exogeneously determined, we have pPB > pMB if
r < (1/2)(6912 + 1103020t4 − 63174t8V + 30459t8 + 730464t3 + 1054252t5 + 69120tV 2 − 2277240t4V
−1487520t3V + 151782t7V 2 − 441312t7V − 601920t2V + 623311t6 + 6912V 2 + 1005836t4V 2
+294336t2V 2 − 138240tV + 904204t5V 2 + 697440t3V 2 + 495367t6V 2 + 69120t− 13824V
−1317154t6V + 298944t2 + 20091t8V 2 − 2206240t5V + 208806t7)/((5t+ 3)(7t+ 6)(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
(78t4V − 381t4 + 276t3V − 1209t3 + 274t2V − 1430t2 + 84tV − 744t− 144)).
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When there is no government regulation, the downstream cable operator can choose from
the following three pricing strategies: mixed bundling, a la carte pricing, and pure bundling.
First we show that pure bundling can strictly dominate mixed bundling for the downstream
monopolist. This result is in contrast to the prediction from one-sided models, where mixed
bundling is the weakly dominant strategy for a monopolist. The difference here comes from
the amount of advertising under the two different regimes, pure and mixed bundling. In
particular, pure bundling can attract less advertising, resulting in higher consumer surplus
and hence higher profits for the monopolist. The amount of advertising also plays a critical
role in determining whether an a la carte regulation is beneficial for the consumers. It
may very well be the case that such a regulation, when the unregulated equilibrium is
characterized by pure bundling (which is the predominant mode of selling TV channels),
hurts consumers (viewers) because it leads to more advertising (for similar reasons there is
more advertising under mixed bundling).
Our model uses the TV industry as a motivating example but it can be easily applied
to other markets that share similar features. It can also handle cases where both sides
of groups receive positive externalities from the other side (as opposed to one receiving
negative, viewers in our model).
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2. Bundling, A La Carte Pricing and Vertical Bargaining in a Two-Sided
Model: An Numerical Approach
2.1 Introduction
This paper intends to examine the profitability of a monopolist to bundle its products.
We compare the monopolist’s profit from offering two goods as a bundle, the profit from
offering two goods a la carte (no bundling), and the profit from a combination of both (mixed
bundling). In an one-sided market, when the monopolist only knows the disrtibution of
consumers’ willingness to pay for each good, intead of each individual consumer’s willingness
to pay, bundling is a useful tool to reduce the heterogenity of consumers. Compared to the
demand curve of individual goods, the demand curve of the bundle will be flatter and more
concentrated, hence bundling products can help the monopolist to extract more surplus. We
use a numerical example which is similar to the examples in Crawford and Cullen (2007) and
Bakos and Bryjolfsson (1999) to show how bundling may flattern the demand curce. Figure
1 exihibits the demands for a bundle of 2 goods and a bundle of 20 goods when the demand
for a single good is normally distributed with mean equal to 2 and variance 1. The blue curve
represents consumers’ demand for a good, while the green curve is their willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for a good under bundling where we assume consumers’ WTP can be equally divided
among the products in a bundle. As the bundle size grows, the demand curve becomes flatter
progressively because the number of consumers with extreme preference decreases. Facing a
flatter demand curve, the monopolist can extract more surplus from consumers (Schmalensee
(1984)). Bakos and Bryjolfsson (1999) show that bundle profit converges to total surplus as
bundle size increases without bound if the marginal cost for bundling components is zero.
≺ figure C.10 
Mixed bundling is the weakly dominant strategy to pure bundling. Compared to pure
bundling, the monopolist is able to generate some demand for individudal goods by offering
stand-alone prices which is slightly lower than the price of bundling (Schmalensee (1984)
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and McAfee et al. (1989)). Our paper finds similar results if we do not include advertise-
ment in our model. However, when we extend the literature from an one-sided market to a
two-sided market, the above result will not always hold. Chen and Serfes (2010) use cable
TV industry which wants to bring two different groups of agents, viewers and advertisers,
on board as an example. In this paper, we assume that viewers place a postive externality
on advertisers while advertisement brings some nuisance cost to viewers. We show that it
is possible for pure bundling to strictly dominate mixed bundling because pure bundling
causes less advertisement which in turn lowers viewers’ nuisance cost from advertisement
and boosts viewers’ willingness-to-pay. In this paper, we have a more general assumption
on consumer preference for two goods by allowing for a correlation between the preferences.
We find that pure bundling makes the monopolist better off if consumers’ willingness-to-pay
for two goods are sufficiently negatively correlated.
This paper is also related to extant literature on demand rotation. Actually, bundling two
goods together as a package will reduce consumers’ heterogeneity but consumers’ mean
willingness-to-pay remains unchanged, causing the demand curve flattened. As the cor-
relation of preferences becomes increasingly positive, the demand curve tends to rotate
clockwisely. Johnson and Myatt (2006) provide a very intuitive explanation on how demand
rotation affects profitability. They find that when consumers’ preference for a product is
relatively homegeneous so that the monopolist has a ”mass market” (serve a large fraction
of consumers), the firm profit increases as the preference become less dispersed because the
marginal consumer’s willingness to pay increases. By contrast, when consumers’ preference
for a product is relatively heterogeous hence the firm can only serve a small ”niche mar-
ket”, the firm can benefit from a more dispersed market because the willingness-to-pay of
the marginal consumer increases as demand rotates clockwise. Overall, as the preference
becomes more dispersed, the profit is ”U-shaped”. Our paper also shows similar results
(tables 1 and 2). When consumers’ willingness-to-pay is sufficiently high so that all con-
sumers have postive willingness-to-pay, the monopolist will charge a price that is lower than
the mean willingness-to-pay. As demand curve rotates clockwise (the correlation becomes
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increasingly positive), firm profit tends to decrease. When consumers’ willingness-to-pay is
low so that the market size is small, the monopolist will charge a price higher than the mean
willingness-to-pay. As demand curve rotates clockwise, firm profit tends to increase.
Following Chen and Serfes (2010), this paper investigates the profitability of bundling and
the effect of an a la carte regulation in a two-sided marekt framework. A literatures review
on two-sided markets and the effects of an a la carte regulation can be found in Chen and
Serfes (2010). This paper relaxes two important assumptions in Chen and Serfes (2010).
First we make a more general assumption about consumers’ preference on two goods. View-
ers’ preference to each good follows a normal distribution and correlated. These two goods
can be either substitutes (the preferences are negatively correlated) or complements (the
preferences are positively correlated). Second, we endogenize the license fee by allowing for
a pair of downstream and uptream firms to bilaterally negotiate over the licenses fee.
The license fee plays an important role in our results. It affects our results in two ways.
First, the license fee is the marginal cost to the downstream monopolist. A higher marginal
cost will boost up the price charged by downstream firms. Second, we model the cable TV
industry as a two-sided market, where the price composition between two sides will affect
the volumn of trade (Rochet and Tirole (2006)). In this two-sided market, TV networks’
profit is composed of two parts: one is the revenue from advertising and the other is the
license fee from the cable operator. Different price composition between these two sides will
generate different profits to TV networks because of the cross-group externalities.
We assume that each pair of upsteam and downsteam firms negotiate over license fees to
maximize the Nash product. Depending on market size, an a la carte regulation will decrease
(increase) license fee if market is large (small). Roughly speaking, whether the license fee
will increase or decrease under a la carte regulation depends on the demand elasticity. A
detailed explanation can be found in section 2.4. When we incorporate both advertisement
and license fee in our model, some interesting results are brought about by the change in
cross-group externalities, t and n.When the network effects are low, that is, t and n are both
low, advertisement level and license fee are the highest under pure bundling (compared to
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no bundling and mixed bundling). A la carte regulation will make consumers better off.
If the per unit nuisance cost from advertisement to viewers increases, that is, advertise-
ment brings strong disutility to viewers and significantly lower viewer willingness-to-pay,
TV network will increase the price for advertisement to lower the advertisement level, and
as a result lower its negative externality. However, when the cross-group externality from
viewers to advertisers increases, that is, the number of viewers strongly increases advertiser
demand, then TV networks, as two-sided platforms, will lower license fee so that it can at-
tract more viewers and create strong positive externality to boost advertiser demand. This
finding demonstrates that, in a two-sided market framework, platforms compete to attract
agents from different groups (e.g., Caillaud and Julien (2003) and Armstrong (2006)). A
main goal of this paper is to show how the composition of the aggregate price affects the
volume of trade (Rochet and Tirole (2006)).
Our model is not limited to TV industry and it can be applied to other markets that have
similar features, e.g., newspapers, credit cards, etc. The negative externality that one side
(advertisers) imposes on the other (viewers) is not crucial for our results. Our main insights
continue to hold even when we assume positive externalities on both sides. One of the main
points in this paper is that the interaction between the two sides affects the profitability of
bundling by influencing the amount of advertising. Basically, pure bundling helps to reduce
the amount of the negative externality. In a model with positive externalities on both sides
(e.g., newspapers where ads are beneficial to the readers, such as coupons, job listings etc.)
pure bundling increases the amount of positive externality, i.e., more advertising in that
setting, making the monopolist better off.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The main model is presented in section
2.2, followed by the benchmark equilibria in section 2.3. The main analysis of the two-sided
model is provided in section 2.4, and section 2.5 is welfare analysis. We conclude in section
2.6.
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2.2 Model
There is a downstream monopolist cable operator offering two channels: a and b. The
monopolist can choose to offer these two channels either a la carte (interchangable with “no
bundling”), together as a bundle (defined as “pure bundling”), or a combination of both
(defined as “mixed bundling”). Under a la carte, viewers are allowed to build the bundle
by paying the price that is equal to the sum of the price of each individual channel. Under
pure bundling, viewers can only choose to either buy the bundle or nothing. Under mixed
bundling, viewers have fours choices: channel a only, channel b only, a bundle of both a and
b, and nothing.
2.2.1 Downstream firm profit
The mass of viewers is equal to 1. Viewers’ preference vi for channel i (i = a, b) is
normally distributed with the mean equal to i and the variance σ
2
i .Viewers’ preferences
for these two goods are correlated with covariance σab. When the covariance is negative,
these two goods are negative correlated and can be consider as a pair of substitutes; when
the covariance is positive, these two goods are a pair of complements. Viewers, taking the
advertising levels on each channel and the prices for the combinations as given, buy the
combination which gives them highest utility.
We assume that consumers are advertisement averse and advertisement brings some nuisance
cost (disutility) to consumers. Let t denote the per unit nuisance cost from advertisement
to viewers and αi the advertising level on channel i, consumer net utility from each channel
is equal to vi − tαi − pi where pi is the price for channel i.
No bundling
≺ figure C.11 
If these two channels are offered separately, and viewers’ net utility (the willingness-to-pay
for an individual channel minus the nuisance cost from advertisement on this channel) is
greater than the stand-alone price, viewers will choose to buy this channel,
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if vi − tαi > pi, viewer will buy channel i
The corresponding demand for each channel is given as follows,
di = 1− F (pi + tαi), i = a, b where F is CDF N(µ, σ2i )
The profit function for the monopolist is
Π = pa + pb = maxpi,i=a,b(1− F (pi + tαi))(pi − ci) (2.1)
where ci is the license fee charged by the TV network. The downstream monopolist takes the
advertising levels and license fees as given and choose the stand-alone prices pi to maximize
its profit.
Pure bundling
≺ figure C.12 
If these two goods are offered together as a bundle, based on viewers’ preference, there are
three possibilities,
• some viewers have very weak preference on channel b where the reservation price from
channel b is lower than the nuisance cost of the advertisement on this channel, but
they have very strong preference to channel a. In this case, these viewers will choose
not to watch channel b, therefore only when their willingness to pay for channel a is
sufficiently high will they subscribe the bundle,
if vb < tαb and va − tαa > pB , subscribe the bundle but don’t watch b
• similarly, some viewers have very weak preference on channel a but very strong prefer-
ence to channel b, then when their willingness to pay for channel b is sufficiently high,
they will still subscribe the bundle
if va < tαa and vb − tαb > pB , subscribe the bundle but don’t watch a
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• viewers don’t have weak preference on either channel. Then when viewers’ net ag-
gregate utility from both channels (the aggregate willingness to pay minus the total
disutility from advertisements on both channels) is greater than the bundle price,
viewers will buy the bundle,
if va > tαa and vb > tαb and va + vb − t(αa + αb) > pB , subscribe the bundle
The demand for the bundle is as follows,
qPB = da + db + dB
where
da =
∫ tαb
−∞
∫ ∞
pB+tαa
f(va, vb)dvadvb
db =
∫ tαa
−∞
∫ ∞
pB+tαb
f(va, vb)dvbdva
dB =
∫ (pB+tαa+tαb)/2
tαa
∫ ∞
pB+tαa+tαb−va
f(va, vb)dvbdva
+
∫ (pB+tαa+tαb)/2
tαb
∫ ∞
pB+tαa+tαb−vb
f(va, vb)dvadvb
+
∫ ∞
(pB+tαa+tαb)/2
∫ ∞
(pB+tαa+tαb)/2
f(va, vb)dvadvb
where f(va, vb) is the density function of the bivariate normal distribution with mean µa
µb
 and the covariance matrix
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ2a σab
σab σ
2
b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣. The portion of viewers da will only watch
channel a, viewer db will watch channel b and dB both.
The profit function for the monopolist is
ΠPB = maxPPBDPB(pPB − ca − cb)
where DPB = da + db + dB
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Mixed bundling
≺ figure C.13 
If the downstream monopolist offers the channels separately and together as a bundle simul-
taneously, the viewers can choose the product that generates the highest net utility.
• The viewers will choose to subscribe channel i only, iff
vi − pi − tαi > vi + v−i − pB − t(αi + a−i) and vi − pi − tai > 0
• The viewers will choose to buy the bundle iff
va + vb − pB − t(αa + αb) > 0
and vi − pB + p−i − tαi > 0
Therefore, the respective demand for each product can be described as follows:
dMBa =
∫ pB−pa+tαb
−∞
∫ ∞
pa+tαa
f(va, vb)dvadvb
dMBb =
∫ pB−pb+tαa
−∞
∫ ∞
pa+tαb
f(va, vb)dvbdva
dMBB =
∫ (pB+tαa+tαb)/2
pB−pa+tαa
∫ ∞
pB+taa+tab−va
f(va, vb)dvbdva
+
∫ (pB+tαa+tαb)/2
pB−pb+tαb
∫ ∞
pB+tαa+tαb−vb
f(va, vb)dvadvb
+
∫ ∞
(pB+tαa+tαb)/2
∫ ∞
(pB+tαa+tαb)/2
f(va, vb)dvadvb
The downstream firm profit function is given as follows:
ΠMB = maxpMBB ,pMBa ,pMBb d
MB
B (p
MB
B − ca − cb) + dMBa (pMBa − ca) + dMBb (pMBb − cb)
2.2.2 Upstream firm profit
The upstream firms (TV channels)’ revenues is composed of two parts, one of which is
from the license fee charged from the downstream operator, and the other is the advertising
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revenue. Here, we assume there is no marginal cost of both sides for TV channels. The
number of viewers places a positive externality on advertisers. The more viewers each
channel has, the higher reservation price advertisers want to pay to advertise on that channel.
Note, in pure bundling, the consumers da, db, and dB will buy both channels, but the
consumers da and db have strong preference to channel a and b respectively, but strongly
dislike the other channel. We assume that these consumers will only watch the channel
they like and ignore the channel they dislike. Therefore there is a difference between the
subscribers and viewers. For channel a, its total number of viewers, qa, will be da + dB
instead of da + db + dB . We assume that the advertiser willingness-to-pay will increase by
n if the number of viewers increases by 1. Therefore, the inverse demand for advertising on
channel i is
gi = nqi − αi
where gi is the advertising fee for advertising on channel i. The profit from advertising is
given by
ΦAi = (nqi − αi)αi
Let ci be the license fee per viewer. Cable operator needs to pay the license fee for each
subcriber no matter he watch this channel or not. The profit from charging license fee is
ΦLi = ciDi
where Di is the number of subscribers that channel i has, i.e. Da = da + db + dB in pure
bundling. TV channel i ’s profit function is given by,
Φi = Φ
L
i + Φ
A
i = maxαiciDi + (nqi − αi)αi
TV networks choose advertising levels to maximize the profit.
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2.2.3 Bargaining
At the same time, the upstream and downstream firms bargain for the license fee. Here,
we use a Nash Bargain approach to solve for the license fee. There are extensive studies on
bilateral negotiations. Similar as the environments in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Hart and
Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Segal and Whinston (2003) where there are
more than one firm in one side of the market, there are two upstreams in our model. The
downstream firm will bargain with each upstream firm (i.e. Comcast-CNN and Comcast-
ESPN) separately and simultaneously. The outcome of Comcast from the negotiation with
CNN depends the outcome of the negotiation between Comcast and ESPN. We assume
that each pair take the outcome from the other pair as given. Each pair of upstream and
downstream firms will choose license fee ci to maximize the Nash product. We assume that
the license fees are linear. The Nash Product for the bargaining over the license fees between
the operator and network i is defined as follows.
NPi = (Π
Y −ΠN )λ(ΦYi − ΦNi )(1−λ)
λ is the bargain power that the downstream monopolist has. In this paper, the upstream
firm and downstream firm are assumed to have equal bargain power, that is, λ = 0.5.
No bundling
Under no bundling case, if the cable operator and network i reach an agreement, the
cable operator’s profit will be the sum of the profits from selling both channels, ΠY = Π,as
shown in (2.1). Network i’s profit is ΦYi = Φi. When the cable operator and network i do
not reach an agreement, the cable operator’s profit will become the profit of only offering
channel j, ΠN = pij = (1− F (pj + tαj))(pj − cj), and the network i’s profit is zero (there is
also no advertising revenue because the advertisers’ reservation price is equal to the number
of viewers of this channel, which is zero if the agreement cannot be reached), ΦNi = 0.
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Therefore, we can explicitly write down the Nash product function,
NPNBi = maxci(Π
Y − pij)λ(ΦYi )(1−λ) = (pii)λ(Φi)(1−λ)
Pure bundling
Under pure bundling case, if the cable operator and network i reach an agreement, the
cable operator’s profit will be the profit from selling both channels as a package, ΠY = ΠPB ,
as shown in (2.2.1). Network i’s profit is ΦYi = Φi. When the cable operator and network i
do not reach an agreement, the cable operator’s profit will become the profit of only offering
channel j, ΠN = pij = (1 − F (pj + tαj))(pj − cj), and network i’s profit is zero (there is
also no advertising revenue because the advertisers’ reservation price is equal to the number
of viewers of this channel, which is zero if the agreement cannot be reached), ΦNi = 0.
Therefore, we can explicitly write down the Nash product function,
NPPBi = maxci(Π
PB − pij)λ(ΦYi )(1−λ)
pij is the monopolist’s optimal profit from channel j when it cannot reach an agreement with
channel i.Here pj should not be the same as the profit from channel j in no bundling because
the license fee cj will be different from the no bundling case.
Mixed bundling
When the cable operator and network i reach an agreement, the cable operator’s profit
will be ΠY = ΠMB , as shown in (2.2.1). Network i’s profit is Φ
Y
i = Φi. When the cable
operator and network i do not reach an agreement, the cable operator’s profit will become
the profit of only offering channel j, ΠN = pij = (1−F (pj + tαj))(pj − cj), and the network
i’s profit is zero (there is also no advertising revenue because the advertisers’ reservation
price is equal to the number of viewers of this channel, which is zero if the agreement cannot
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be reached), ΦNi = 0. Therefore, we can explicitly write down the Nash product function,
NPMBi = maxci(Π
MB − pij)λ(ΦYi )(1−λ)
pj is the monopolist’s optimal profit from channel j when it can’t reach the agreement with
channel i.Here pj should not be the same as the profit from channel j in the no bundling
because the license fee cjwill be different from the no bundling case. We model a three stage
game:
• Stage 1: The upstream monopolist cable operator announces whether to offer these
two goods as a bundle or a la carte.
• Stage 2: The downstream TV channels set advertising levels, αi. Upstream and
downstream firms bilaterally negotiate over license fees, ci.
• Stage 3 Downstream firms choose prices, pi.
Due to the complexicity of two-dimension demand function, it is impossible to derive the
analytical expression ∂pi∂ci and
∂pi
∂αi
when solving backward for the equilibria. Therefore,
we derive the equilibria numerically. In the numerical estimation, we hold the standard
deviation of the valuation to the goods, σi, constant, which is equal to 10, while we vary
other parameters. The key parameters of the model that affect the equilibrium outcomes
are: (1) Mean valuation to two goods, µi. We define the market as a ”big market” when
µi is equal to 30, where almost every consumer has a positive valuation to the goods, and
define the market as a ”small market” when µi is equal to 10 or 15, where there are some
portions of the viewers that have negative valuation. (2) The cross-group externalities, t
and n. When t and n are low, the externalities are low. As t and n increase, the externalities
enhance. (3) The correlation coefficient of the viewers’ valuation to two goods, ρ. These
two goods are substitutes to consumers when ρ is negative, independent when ρ is zero, and
complements when ρ is positive.
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2.3 Benchmark: no upstream firm
≺ table B.1 table B.2 
First, we look at the equilibria where there is no upstream firm, that is, there is no adver-
tisement and license fee. TableB.1 shows the equilibria under no bundling, pure bundling
and mixed bundling. The result is consistent with the literature on bundling where mixed
bundling is a weakly dominant strategy for a monopolist, e.g., Schmalensee (1984), and
McAfee, et.al (1989). By offering the mixed bundle the monopolist is able to sort the view-
ers and price discriminate. Under mixed bundling, viewers pay higher price for a single
channel than under no bundling, while the price for the bundle is slightly lower than under
pure bundling. Not surprisingly, this flexibility boosts the monopolist’s profit. The number
of viewers under mixed bundling and pure bundling are significantly higher than under no
bundling (the number of viewer under MB is slightly higher than under PB but no signifi-
cantly).
The change in the profit as the correlation coefficient changes is consistent with the findings
in Johnson and Myatt (2006). When consumers’ mean reservation price is high where the
firm has a large market, the firm will charge a relatively low price to serve the mass of the
market. As the corraltion coefficient increases (demand rotates clockwise), the monopolist
profit decreases and the monopolist prefers a low dispersion. However, when consumers’
mean reservation price is low so that the monopolist will charge a high price to serve a
niche portion of the consumers, the monopolist prefers a high dispersion, and its profit will
increase as the correlation coefficient increases.
Result 1: When there is no upstream firm, mixed bundling is the weakly domi-
nant strategy of the monopolist. In a big market, the profit from pure bundling
decreases as the correlation coefficient increases. However, when the market is
small, as the correlation coefficient increases, the profit from pure bundling will
increase.
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2.4 Equilibria with upstream firm
In this section, we discuss the numerical equilibria with upstream firms. First, we discuss
the equilibria with advertisement but assume that the license fees are zero. By comparing
these equilibria to the benchmark model, we are able to see how advertisement will affect
the results. Second, by assuming advertising levels equal to zero, we investigate how an
a la carte regulation affects the license fees. Finally, we incorporate both advertisement
and license fees to investigate how the price composition of the TV network, a two-sided
platform, affects the volumn of trade.
2.4.1 No license fees but with advertisement
≺ table B.3 table B.4 
In this section, we assume that the license fees are equal to zero. The upstream TV networks
choose the advertising levels to maximize their profit. Table B.3 shows the equilibria where
both cross-group externalities, t and n, equal to 1. Table B.4 shows the equilibria with larger
cross-group externalities (t and n are both equal to 10). The advertising levels are the lowest
under no bundling because no bundling is disadvantageous in attracting viewers. When the
cross-group externalities are high, the advertising levels increase. Compared to the equilib-
ria when t and n are low, the advertising levels are significantly higher in the equilibrium
when t and n are high, while the number of viewers is significantly lower. This is because
as n increases, the advertiser’s WTP is enhanced because of the positive externality from
viewers. However, higher advertising levels will lower viewers’ demand especially when t is
also high.
Note, as t is high, it is possible that pure bundling strictly dominates mixed bundling (i.e.
when ρ = −0.5, the advertising level is 1.76 under PB and 1.87 under MB. The monopolist
cable operator profit is 14.84 under PB and 13.57 under MB). This is because the advertising
levels are lower under pure bundling than under mixed bundling. A lower advertising level
means lower disutility for viewers which will boost viewers’ demand for the channel, and
allow the monopolist cable operator to charge higher price. This result is consistant with
37
the main finding in Chen and Serfes (2010). The reason why the advertisement level will be
lower under pure bundling can been seen in Chen and Serfes (2010) as well.
Result 2: In a two sided market, it is possible that pure bundling strictly dom-
inates mixed bundling. This is because the advertising levels are lower under
pure bundling, which will boost viewer demand for channels and allow the cable
operator to charge higher price.
2.4.2 No advertisement but with license fees
≺ table B.5 table B.6 
In this section, we focus on the effect on the license fees when there is an a la carte regulation.
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009) show an a la carte regulation will increase license fees,
however, Rennhoff and Serfes (2009) show that the license fees will be lower under a la
carte regulation. Both these two papers assume that license fees are determined by the
negotiation of the upstream and downstream firms. In this paper, we demonstrate that
both results are possible depending on the size of the market. The numerical simulation
shows that the license fees are lower under a la carte in a large market where all viewers
have positive willingness to pay (as shown in table 5 where µi = 30), and are higher under
a la carte in a small market where a significant portion of viewers have negative willingness
to pay (as shown in table 6 where µi = 15).
From first order condition of the Nash product,
dNP
dci
= 2− qp − qc = 2− |qp|(1 + pc)
where qp is viewers’ demand elasticity of price, 
q
c is the viewers’ demand elasticity of license
fee and pc is the elasticity of price (final price) for channel to license fee (marginal cost).
If dNPdci is higher (lower) than zero, license fees increase (decrease). When we move from
pure bundling to no bundling, whether license fees will increase or decrease depends on the
demand elasticity of price. If demand elasticity is high (low), the first order derivative of
Nash product will be lower (higher) than zero, and the license fees will decrease (increase).
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If we fix the license fee at its level under pure bundling, the demand is more elastic when is
high. Let us take ρ = −0.5 as an example. When µi = 30,if we fix the license fee at the level
of 13.13, then |qp| = 1.8843, pc = 0.2040, and dNP
NB
dci
|c=cPB = −0.2687.Therefore, when
moving from pure bundling to no bundling, license fees decrease. When µi = 15, if we fix
the license fee at the level of 6.72, |qp| = 1.5798, pc = 0.2056, and dNP
NB
(dci
|c=cPB = 0.096.In
this case, license fees increase from pure bundling to no bundling.
≺ figure C.14 
≺ table B.7 
Even though in the case of mean willingness-to-pay equal to 30 where the license fees are
higher under pure bundling, it is still possible that the monopolist gets higher profit from
pure bundling. This is an extension of extant bundling literature that bundling is more
profitable than no bundling even if the marginal cost is not zero. As far as the correlation
coefficient is negative sufficiently, the monopolist is able to sort consumers and create the
demand, thus increase its profit even though the monopolist needs to pay higher marginal
cost. The profit from the demand creation will exceed the loss in profit due to higher
marginal cost. Result 3: License fees will increase (decrease) in a small (big)
market when there is an a la carte regulation.
2.4.3 With license fees and advertisement
In this section, we include the license fees and advertisement in the model. We assume
that TV networks will choose the advertising level to maximize their profit. Simultaneouly,
each pair of upstream TV network and downstream cable operator will negotiate over the
license fee to maximize the Nash produt.
≺ table B.8 table B.9 table B.10 table B.11 
As summarized in tables B.8-B.11, the total number of viewers is the highest under pure
bundling and the least under no bundling, therefore, the advertising levels are the highest
under pure bundling and the lowest under no bundling, which indicates that an a la carte
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regulation will cause TV networks to allocate less advertisement.
As shown in table B.8, where t=1 and n=1, the license fees are the highest under pure
bundling. However, if we increase both the cross-group externalities, the license fees are
significantly lower under pure bundling. There are two effects associated. The first effect is
related to the negative externality from advertisement to viewers. Higher per unit nuisance
cost will lower viewers’ willingness to pay, which will in turn shift viewers’ demand inside,
which will pull the final price and marginal cost. The second effect is associated with the
positive externality from viewers to advertisers. At any level of viewers, higher n indicates
higher advertisers’ willingness to pay. Hence the TV network is able to attract more adver-
tisers, therefore, the TV network, as a platform of two different groups of agent, is willing to
lower the license fee so that it can increase the volume of trade (Rochet and Tirole (2006)).
Tables B.10 and B.11 also illustrate the result that in a two-sided market, the composition of
the aggregate price affects the volume of trade. In table B.10 where there is small negative
externality from advertisement to viewers (t=1) but high positive externality from viewers
to advertisers (n=5), compared to the result in table B.8, TV networks will agree to lower
license fees to attract more viewers, as a result, increasing its revenue from advertisement.
However, in Table 11 where there is high negative externality from advertisement to viewers
(t=3) but low positive externality from viewers to advertisers (n=1),TV networks would
like to give up the revenue from advertisement but increase the revenue from license fees by
charging higher license fee to the cable operator.
Result 4: When both t and n are low, the advertising level and license fees
are the highest under pure bundling. When the cross-group externality from
viewers to advertisers, n, is strong while the disutility from advertisement to
viewers, t, remains low, the TV networks are willing to lower the revenue from
license fees so that they can increase the revenue from advertisement. However,
when the disutility from advertisement to viewers is high but the cross-group
externality from viewer to advertiser is low, the TV networks will focus on the
revenue from license fees and give up the revenue from advertisement.
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Result 5: When both t and n are high, the license fees will be the lowest under
pure bundling. Pure bundling strictly dominates mixed bundling.
2.5 Welfare analysis
In this section, we discuss the welfare properties of the equilibria. There are four groups
of agents in our model: an upstream cable operator, two downstream TV networks, viewers,
and two groups of advertisers who advertise on TV networks. The social welfare is defined as
the sum of consumer surplus, downstream firm profit, upstream firms’ profits and advertiser
surplus.
TS = CS + piD +U +CSad
The calculation of consumer surplus, CS, downstream firm profit, piD, upstream firm profit,
piU can be found in section (3.3). The advertiser surplus from advertising on channel i is as
follows:
CSadi =
∫ a∗i
0
gi(αi, α
∗
−i)− g∗i (α∗i , α∗−i)dαi
In the discussion of the welfare properties, we focus on the equilibria where µ = [30, 30].
The factors that will affect the welfare properties in the equilibria can be characterized as:
network effect and marginal cost effect. Network effect refers to the fact that the changes
in the values of cross-group externalities, t and n, will affect the advertising levels in the
equilibria, and the change in advertising levels will place an negative effect on the consumer
welfare and total social welfare. Marginal cost effect refers to the change in license fees
will affect the prices of the channels that consumers need to pay, therefore, will affect the
allocation of the welfare among consumers, the downstream cable operator and upstream
TV networks.
2.5.1 Welfare with no upstream firm
Table B.12 shows the welfare of downstream monopolist and the consumers when there
is no advertisement and license fee. Pure bundling can reduce consumer heterogeneity and
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flatten the demand curve so that the monopolist can extract more surplus from consumers.
When the correlation coefficient of consumers’ valuation to two channels, ρ, is negative, that
is, when these two channels are substitutes to consumers, the advantage of pure bundling
in extracting surplus from consumers is significant. Furthermore, mixed bundling is the
second degree price discrimination and has advantage in extracting surplus from consumers.
Consumer can benefit from an a la carte regulation. The monopolist will be worse off from
an a la carte regulation. An a la carte regulation will lower the social welfare.
≺ table B.12 
Result 6: When there is no upstream firm, an a la carte regulation will benefit
consumers while hurt the downstream cable operator, and the total surplus will
decrease.
2.5.2 Welfare with advertisement but no license fee
Advertisement plays an important force on the effect of an a la carte regulation. Table
B.13 is the welfare when cross-group externalities are low, that is, both t and n are equal
to 1. Overall, since consumers dislike advertisement, advertisement reduces welfare. Under
a la carte, TV networks can attract less viewers, making them less attractive to advertisers.
The advertising levels are the lowest under a la carte. Table B.14 shows the welfare when
both t and n are equal to 10. As n increases, the advertisers’ WTP is enhanced, so the
advertising levels increase. Higher advertising levels will lower viewers’ demand especially
when t is also high. Compared to the results in Table B.14, we can see that as cross-group
externalities increase, the downstream firm’s profit is signicantly lower. Upstream firms’
revenue (revenue from advertisement) is significantly higher.
The effect of an a la carte regulation on the cable operator is different from the case with-
out upstream firms. It is possible that the cable operator may benefit from an a la carte
regulation no matter the unregulated equilibrium is pure bundling or mixed bundling. This
is because a la carte regualtion will lower the negative externality. Also, an a la carte reg-
ulation may increase the social welfare when the correlation coefficient of the valuations to
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these two channels is postive.
≺ table B.13 table B.14 
Result 7: When incorporating advertisement in the model, the downstream
cable operator, thus the total social welfare, may benefit from an a la carte
regulation when the cross-group externalities are high.
2.5.3 Welfare with advertisement and license fee
In this section, we incorporate license fees in the model. Due to double marginalization,
the change in license fees will affect the price charged by the downstream firm to the viewers.
As a result, the license fees will affect consumers’ welfare. As discussed in section 2.4, an a
la carte regulation will either increase or decrease the license fees depending on the market
size. In a small market, the license fees are higher under an a la carteand therefore, bring
about some negative effects on consumer welfare.
Tables B.15 and B.16 show the welfare with both advertisement and license fees. Table
B.15 shows the welfare when t and n are low. The advertising level and license fees are
the highest under pure bundling, therefore, the upstream TV network profit will be the
highest. Both high license fees and advertisement level will act to lower consumer welfare,
therefore, consumer surplus is the lowest under pure bundling. From the perspective of the
downstream cable operator, since the license fees are lower under a la carte, it is possible
that it may be better off from an a la carte regulation.
Table B.16 represents the welfare when the network effect is strong. Generally speaking, a
higher n means that viewers are more valuable to advertisers and TV networks are willing
to lower license fees to increase the total number of viewers (first effect). This will help to
increase consumer surplus. However, more viewers each channel has, more advertisement
will be placed. The higher advertisement will first directly lower consumer welfare due to
the nuisance cost (second effect). Furthermore, the higher advertisement level will lower
consumers’ willingness-to-pay and consequently affect the final price that viewers pay for
the channels and the license fees that the cable operator pays to TV networks (third effect).
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The third effect is the strongest under pure bundling because viewers’ demand is more elastic
under pure bundling, therefore, cable operator is more willing to lower price. This will help
to increase consumer welfare. Overall, compared to consumer surplus with low network
effect, consumer surplus decreases under no bundling and mixed bundling as network effect
increases, while consumer surplus under pure bundling with strong network effect increases.
The license fees are significantly lower under pure bundling than under mixed bundling and
no bundling, which increase the profit of the downstream cable operator. It is possible that
pure bundling strictly dominates mixed bundling.
≺ table B.15 table B.16 
Result 9: In the model with advertisement and license fees, if the unregulated
equilibrium is pure bundling equilibrium, an a la carte regulation may make
consumers worse off when both t and n are high. When both t and n are low,
the downstream cable operator may benefit from an a la carte regulation.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct a numerical simulation by relaxing two assumptions made
in the first chapter. First, viewers’ willingness to pay for the channels is not assumed
uniformly distributed but follows a bivariate normal distribution. Second, the license fees
that the downstream cable operator pays to the upstream TV channels are not exogenously
determined, but are endogenously negotiated and determined by these two parties via Nash
bargaining. We numerically simulate the equilibria of no bundling, mixed bundling and pure
bundling, and find that pure bundling flattens viewers’ demand, and enables the monopolistic
cable operator to extract more surplus from consumers. However, if the upstream networks
and the downstream cable operator are allowed to bilaterally negotiate the license fees,
license fees will be higher (lower) under pure bundling, depending on whether the cable
operator has mass (niche) market demand. Advertisement plays a very important role. By
incorporating advertisement in our model, we find that it is possible that pure bundling
strictly dominates mixed bundling. Our paper also discusses the welfare implications of an
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a la carte regulation. In our benchmark model, we show that an a la carte regulation will
benefit consumers and hurt the cable operator. However, when incorporating advertisement
and license fees in our model, consumers may be worse off, while the cable operator may
benefit from an a la carte regulation. Therefore, our paper can provide a second thought
about the advocation for an a la carte regulation in cable TV industry. Our model, using
the TV industry as a motivating example, can be easily applied to other markets that share
similar features. It can also be extended to the cases where both sides of groups receive
positive externalities from the other (as opposed to one receiving negative externalities, like
the viewers in our model).
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3. A la Carte Cable and the Market for Advertisement
3.1 Introduction
The debates on whether the government should impose an a la carte regulation on cable
industry have received increasing attention. Consumer groups and politicians argue that
bundling TV channels together contributes to the tremendous increase of the cable price.
They ask FCC to regulate this industry and force cable and satellite operators to offer chan-
nels a la carte and allow consumers to choose purchasing only the TV channels they want.
However, cable interest groups argue that if cable operators respond to a la carte regulation
by increasing the price for each individual channel, consumers’ total bill for cable may go
up with fewer channels. Therefore, they argue that a la carte pricing will hurt consumers.
The attitute of FCC is ambiguous. In its first report in 2004, it concluded that an a la carte
regulation will reduce economy of scale, increase the transaction cost, therefore increase
the price of channels. This regulation would be of little benefit to consumers(FCC (2004)).
However, its second report in 2006, reversed many of its arguments in the previous report
and conclude that consumers may, in fact, substantially benefit from an a la carte regulation
(FCC (2006)).
A rich theoretical literature on bundling shows that bundling can reduce consumers’ het-
erogeneity and flatten the demand curve. Crawford and Cullen (2007) and Bakos and
Bryjolfsson (1999) show how bundling flatterns the demand curve. Figure 1 exihibits the
demands for a bundle of 2 goods and a bundle of 20 goods when the demand for one good
is normally distributed with mean equal to 2 and variance 1. The blue curve represents the
demand for one good, and the green curve is the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for one good un-
der bundling where we assume consumers’ WTP can be equally divided among the products
in the bundle. As the bundle size grows, the demand curve becomes flatter progressively
because the number of consumers with extreme preference decreases. Facing a flatter de-
mand curve, the monopolist is able to extract more surplus from consumers (Schmalensee
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(1984)). Bakos and Bryjolfsson (1999) show that bundle profit converges to total surplus as
bundle size increases without bound if the marginal costs for bundled components are zero.
≺ figure C.10 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of an a la carte regula-
tion in cable TV industry using the results from a cable demand estimation model, which
help quantify the benefits and costs from a proposed a la carte regulation. Households’
decision on TV watching can be devided into two steps: (1) what package to purchase;
(2) conditional on the package subscription, which channels to watch. In the estimation of
households’ television-watching decision, we formally incorporate the advertisement in the
model to see how advertisement may affect the ratings of channels, that is, does the adver-
tisement on TV channels affect viewers’ stickiness to a channel? Or will audience switch
to other channels if there is too much advertisement? Besides the channel characteristics,
different advertisement level is an important source to explain the differenct rating between
channels.
This paper also investigates what factors affect advertisers’ demand for advertising on tele-
vision. Since 1970s, the volumn of TV advertisement has increased tremendously. The TV
ad expenditure increased from around $1,600 millions in 1960 to 71,000 millions in 20071.
Out of all advertising mediums, television remains one of the most important. The share of
the TV ad expenditure out of total ad expenditure increased from less than 14% in 1960 to
more than 25% in 20072. Advertisers advertise on TV programs to delivery the information
about their products to viewers, and it would be worthwhile to investigate how the number
of viewers influences the demand for advertisement. Our paper etimates an aggregate in-
verse demand function for advertising on channels.
We conduct a full a la carte counterfactural simulation to investigate the policy implication
when cable and satellite operators are forced to offer the most 10 popular TV channels a
la carte. To do this, we first recover the license fees that cable/satellite operators pay to
TV channels and the other marginal cost that cable operators have to run the package. We
1Sources: Universal McCann, reported at www.tvb.org.
2Sources: Universal McCann, reported at www.tvb.org.
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assume that the license fees are determined via bilaterally negotiation of an upstream TV
network and downstream TV channels. We then use the estimated license fees to estimate
the prices for these 10 channels. In current counterfactual estimation, we assume that the
license fees remain at the level before an a la carte regulation. We also assume that the an
a la carte regulation will not affect the advertising level as well.
3.1.1 Literature review
There are many empirical works examining the short run welfare effect of a la carte pric-
ing in cable television industry. Byzalov (2008), Crawford and Yurukoglu (2008), Rennhoff
and Serfes (2008) and Yurukoglu (2008) assume that consumers’ valuation of a bundle of
channels is the utility from watching those channels. Byzalov (2008) uses individual-level
data (from Simmons Research) of cable/satellite subscriptions and viewership for 64 main
cable channels to estimate consumers’ utility from a bundle. If cable companies are forced
to break up the bundle into 7 themed tiers by channel genre, consumers cannot benefit too
much from a la carte. The license fee per subscriber may increase becasue there may be a
significant drop in the number of subscribers. Rennhoff and Serfes (2008) explicitly model
the strategic interactions between cable operators and cable TV networks on the license fee.
They find that consumer welfare increases unambiguously under a la carte pricing because
the expected monthly expenditure per household falls by more 15 percent.
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2008) and Yurukoglu (2008) both docompose the utility from
bundle into two steps. First, conitional on subscribing the bundle, they use the market-level
data on how households allocate their leisure time to channels to estimate consumers’ utility
from watching the channels they have purchased. Second, they deduct households’ disutility
of paying for the bundle and the total utility from bundle. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2008)
then conduct a counterfactual simulation which forces cable companies to offer the channels
separately and charge prices for each individual component, while Yurukoglu (2008) allows
for the the negotiation of supply contracts between the cable TV networks and cable com-
panies. None of the above works explicitly model advertisement in viewers’ utility function
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and examine the effect of advertisement on viewers’ utility. Wilbur (2008) proposes a two-
sided model of television industry. On one hand, he estimates how the advertising units
affect viewers’ demand and, on the other hand, estimates how the audience size influences
advertisers’ demand. By using the data of 6 US broadcast television networks, he finds that
viewers tend to be advertisement averse.
Our paper combines these two streams of literarture together, and explicitly incorporate ad-
vertisement level in viewers utility function to investigate how advertisement affects viewers’
watching behavior. We also test how audience size affects advertisers’ demand for adver-
tisement. Put differently, we examine the two-sideness of television industry. Moreover, this
paper also examines the policy implications that cable and satellite operators are forced to
offer TV channels a la carte.
3.2 Data
Three categories of data are used: (i) the data of television programming services, which
measure viewers’ package purchasing behavior; (ii) viewership data (rating), which measure
viewers’ preference on channels; and (iii) the advertising data, which tell us the advertising
unit and price on each channel.
The data of television programming services are from the Television and Cable Factbook.
The main data in the Television and Cable Factbook are the number of television program-
ming services (cable and satellite television packages) provided, the monthly fees and the
market shares of these services. The Factbook also provides the information of channel
composition in a particular cable service, the homes passed which can be used to measure
the market size of each service, and other characteristics of cable/satellite services. In this
paper, we use all television programming systems in May, 2005 across 46 DMAs. Descriptive
statistics for these services are reported in table B.17.
The viewership data and the advertising data are both from Nielsen Media Research. The
viewership data contain local ratings and projections (estimated viewers in thousands) for 29
selected cable networks during the primetime for May 2005 (from April 28 to May 25). The
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rating is the share of the households with television in the DMA viewing the channels. Data
cover 46 DMA markets. The local rating shows the share of universal TV households who
tuned to a program in the given time period. Observations are recorded by following the
pattern of channel-market-day. The local rating based on the days in a week and channels
are reported in table B.18.
The variables in advertising data include: total advertisement units, GRP (gross rating
point), and the estimated cost per thousand (CPM) for all advertisements airing on 29 na-
tional cable networks during the primetime in May 2005. One unit of advertisement is a
piece of advertisement that is aired with the length of either 15 seconds, 30 seconds or 60
seconds. The number of advertisement for each channel is measurede by the average adver-
tisement unit within 30 minutes of programs during the primetime. GRP is the proxy of
audience size. It is used to measure the exposure to one or more programs and commercials,
without regard to multiple exposures of the same advertising to individuals. CPM measures
advertisers’ cost per thousand viewers who are exposed to a commercial. The total cost for
one or a series of commercials is divided by the projected audience in thousands. Descriptive
statistics for these services are reported in table B.19.
Besides these three primary categories, the data of program characteristics are also used
in estimations. Program characteristics are hand-collected by the authors. We divide the
programs aired during the sample period into 22 genres: comedy show, csi, documentary,
reality, sitcom, drama, kids show, law order, movie action, movie comedy, movie crime,
movie drama, movie horror, movie thriller, movie western, music, news, food, sports baseball,
sports basketball, sports wrestling, and sports other. Since each observation of the local
rating data is recorded as channel-market-day and we don’t have the rating based on the
program level, the value of these program characteristics is in percentage. For example,
the programs on AEN during the primetime on April 28, 2005 are: 8:00-10:00 pm “Cold
Case Files” and 10:00-11:00 pm “The First 48”. The first program belongs to the genre
of “documentary” and the second to the genre of “drama”. Then we record the program
characteristics for AEN on April 28 as 66.67% in “documentary” and 33.33% in “drama”.
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3.3 Model
In this section, we present a model of agent behavior. We formally model households’
decisions regarding television-watching and cable package choices, programming operators’
pricing decisions, and television channels’ advertisement pricing decisions. We begin with
households’ viewing and purchasing decisions.
3.3.1 Households demand model
In our model, households face two interconnected decisions: which cable/satellite pack-
age to purchase and, conditional upon that choice, which channel to watch. The choices
are interconnected because a household’s cable package determines the choice set they face
when deciding what to watch and, conversely, their likely viewing choices impact which ca-
ble/satellite package they purchase. Below, we present a model that captures both elements
of this relationship.
Television viewing choices
We begin with a simple random coefficient logit model of viewing choice by allowing
for individual-specific deviation for the preference of advertisement3. Conditional on the
subscription of a certain television programming service, we assume that households, on any
given night, choose to watch the channel that yields the highest utility. Households may also
select to forgo watching television on certain days. The utility that household i in market
m receives from watching channel j on day t is given as follows:
uijmt = Xjmtβ + qjt(α+ ηi) + ξjmt + ijmt (3.1)
= δjmt + qjtηi + ijmt
where Xjmt is a vector of observable characteristics for channel j (e.g. the genre of shows on
channel j during a given day, market, and the day-of-week dummies), qjt is the aggregate
3In future versions of the paper, we intend to allow for greater heterogeneity by adopting a random
coefficients logit specification.
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amount of national advertising on channel j during day t. ξjt captures unobserved product
characteristics of channel j, and α and β are viewers’ taste parameters. ηi is a random
draw for individual i. Here, we modify Cohen (2008) by assuming that the individuals have
nonnegative deviation on the preference of advertisement. More specifically, a measures
viewers’ maximum disutility from advertising which is common to all viewers and α+ ηi is
the total disutility from advertising. We may define djmt as the mean utility from channel j
in market m on day t. Finally, ijmt is viewer i’s idiosyncratic error term and is distributed
type I extreme value.
Given the specification in equation (3.1), we can derive the probability that household i
watches channel j on day t, conditional on receiving television programming package k, as
follows:4
sjmt|k =
eδjmt+qjtηi
1 +
∑
c in k e
δcmt+qctηi
(3.2)
While equation (3.2) expresses the probability that a household with package k watches
channel j, Nielsen channel viewing reports give aggregate totals per market. In order to
match the market-level Nielsen data, we must aggregate viewer shares over all television
programming providers and all offered programming packages. In each market m, there are
cable and satellite operators offering a number of different television programming packages.
For example, cable television providers such as Comcast offer both ”basic” and ”expanded
basic” programming options in a variety of markets. At the aggregate level, the share of
households watching channel j depends on which packages this channel is included in and
the probability of households subscribing to these packages. Accounting for this, we can
write the percentage of the population in market m watching channel j on day t (sjmt) as:
sjmt =
∑
k cont.j
(sjmt|k ∗ Skm) (3.3)
where sjmt|k is the share of households with package k that derive the highest utility
4We are also implicitly assuming in equation (3.2) that programming package k contains channel j.
Household subscripts are not necessary in equation (3.2) because of our assumption of homogeneity of
preferences.
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from watching channel j and Skm is the share of households in market m who subscribe to
programming package k.
Programming package choice
The utility that a household receives from watching the included channels helps de-
termine the likelihood of purchasing a given programming package. We define this utility
term as a household’s daily average expected maximized utility aggregated over all days.
Mathematically, this expected television watching utility (Wkm) can be written:
Wkm =
T∑
t=1
[log(
∑
cink
exp(δcmt + qjtηi))] (3.4)
The programming package subscription decision also depends on a variety of other factors,
such as the disutility from the package’s price or the total number of channels offered in a
given package. Assume that there are K programming packages offered in market m. In
each market, there are two television programming operators, which we index with n: a local
cable monopolist and a satellite television provider.5 Each household must decide whether
to purchase one of these K packages or forgo receiving access to television channels (aside
from those available over-the-air). Household i’s utility from purchasing package k provided
by programming operator n in market m is given by:
Uiknm = Wkm + Zknmκ− γPknm + ηknm + eiknm = ωknm + eiknm
where Wkm is the utility that household i expects to receive from watching the channels in-
cluded in package k, Zkmn is a vector of programming package characteristics (ex. operator
dummies, number of channels in package k), Pknm is the monthly price of package k, ηknm
represents unobserved characteristics of package k, eiknm is an idiosyncratic error term dis-
tributed type I extreme value, and κ and γ are parameters to be estimated. The assumption
5In our model K-1 of these packages are offered by the local cable monopolist. Due to limitations in data
availability, we assume that the satellite provider offers only one programming package, which we proxy
using DirecTV’s Choice package.
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regarding eiknm’s distribution allows us to derive the market share of each package k as:
Skm =
eωknm
1 +
∑K
b e
ωbnm
3.3.2 Programming operator profit maximization
Programming operators purchase channels from the television network owners, such as
Time Warner, and then package and sell them to households. Programming operator n’s
profit from package k in market m is:
pdownknm = SknmMm(Pknm −
∑
all j in k
rj − cknm) (3.5)
where Pkmn is the price of the package k in market m by operator n. rj is the (per-
subscriber) license fee that the programming operator pays to the owner of channel j. cknm
is the marginal cost (except the license fees for the 29 sample channels in our data) for
programming operators to carry package k. If programming operator n offers Knm packages
in market m, then n’s total profit is simply the summation of all package profit:
Πnm =
Knm∑
k
pknm (3.6)
Programming operators choose the price for each of their Knm packages in order to maximize
their total profit. The corresponding first order condition can be written as follows:
∂Πdownnm
∂Pknm
=
Knm∑
z
∂piznm
∂Pknm
= 0 (3.7)
54
where
∂piknm
∂Pknm
= SknmMm +
∂Sknm
∂Pknm
Mm(Pknm −
∑
all j inknm
rj − cknm)
= SknmMm − γSknm(1− Sknm)Mm(Pknm − Σall c in knmrj − cknm)
∂piznm
∂Pknm
=
∂Sznm
∂Pknm
Mm(Pznm −
∑
all j in znm
rj − cknm)
= γSznmSknmMm(Pznm −
∑
all j in znm
rj − cknm)
The solution to this system of first order conditions characterizes the optimal programming
package price vector.
3.3.3 Advertiser demand
Advertisers value the air-time during particular programs based on factors such as the
audience size and viewers’ demographics. Following Wilbur (2008), we assume that the
aggregate inverse demand for advertising on a given channel and day is given by:
pjt = qjtλ+ Vjtθ + Yjη + µjt (3.8)
where pjt is the price of advertising at channel j on day t, Vjt is the total number of viewers
watching channel j on day t (in all markets)6, and Yjt is a vector of characteristics of channel
j, λ,θ and η are advertisers’ preference parameters, and µjt is an error term
3.3.4 Television networks
Television networks receive revenue from two sources. They charge per-subscriber license
fees to programming operators and they also sell a number of advertising slots during their
network programming to advertisers. The profit function of channel j is given as follows:
pupj =
∑
all t
(qjtλ+ Vjtθ + Yjη)qjt +
∑
all m
Mm(Sall n(Sknm ∗ rjn)) (3.9)
6Vjt =
∑
all m Vjmt =
∑
all m(Mm ∗ sjmt)
55
The first term in equation (3.9) is the profit that the television network owner receives
from advertisement. The second term in equation (3.9) represents the profit generated by
charging license fees to programming operators. Mathematically, the second term is equal
to the total number of subscribers in all markets multiplied by the per subscriber license
fee.
Television network owner’s profit is the summation of equation (3.9) over all of the channels
they own.
Πup =
∑
all c belong to n
(
∑
all t
(qctλ+ Vctθ + Ycη −mcct)qct +
∑
all m
Mm(Sall n(Scnm ∗ rcn)))
The profit-maximizing problem for a television network owner is quite complex. We can
think of modeling it as a three stage game. In the first stage, the network owner chooses
its programs. In the second stage, given these programs, the network owner determines
its daily programming schedule. Finally, in the third stage, networks choose the amount of
advertising to air during each program and the license fee to charge each television program-
ming operator. Following Wilbur (2008), we abstract away from the first two stages and
focus solely on the final stage where advertising amounts and license fees are determined.
We assume that television networks will choose the advertisement units to maximize their
profit. The first order condition can be written as:
∂Πup
∂qjt
=
∑
all c belongs to n
∂piupc
∂qjt
= 0
= pjt −mcct + λqjt + θ
∑
m
(
∂Vjmt
∂qjt
qjt +
∑
c
∂Vcmt
∂qjt
qct) +
∑
allm
Mm(
∑
k cont j
∂Sknm
∂qjt
rjn)
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where
∂Πnet
∂rj
=
∑
all j belongs to T
(
∑
all j belongs to T
∂pinetj
∂rj
) = 0 (3.10)
=
∑
all j belongs to T
(
∑
all m
θMm(
∑
t
sjmt|kqjt)
∂Sknm
∂rj
+
∑
all m
Mm
∂Sknm
∂rj
rj) +
∑
allm
MmSknm
(3.11)
where
∂Sknm
∂rj
=
∂Sknm
∂Pkcm
∂Pknm
∂rj
∂Sknm
∂Pknm
= −γSknm(1− Sknm)
∂Pknm
∂rjm
=
1
(1 + γSknm(Pknm −
∑
all j in k rj − cknm))
(3.12)
When the license fee of channel j increases, it will drive up the prices of the packages which
include j, and decrease the share of subscription of these packages. As a result, the share
of households who choose to watch channel j will be affected, which in turn will affect the TV
network’s revenue from advertisement. The first component,
∑
all m θMm(
∑
t sjmt|kqjt)
∂Sknm
∂rj
,
in (3.11) represents the loss of advertisement revenue when the TV network increases its
license fee.
3.4 Estimation and identification
3.4.1 Taste preference estimation
The estimation of households’ demand is divided into two steps: First, we estimate
viewers’ mean utility, δjmt, from viewing channels conditional on the purchase of the bundled
package. We conduct this estimation by using the local rating data. In this step, we
incorporate the advertising units to estimate how viewers dislike the advertisement. Second,
we use the market share of households who purchase different packages to estimate the
disutility from the price.
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In equation (3.3), the left-hand side is the rating (share of viewing) which is the aggregate
data on DMA level. The observed share on the right-hand side is the share of subscription
whose unit of observation is cable market. One DMA may include many cable markets. To
overcome the inconsistency of two dataset, we transfer these ”cable market” observations into
DMA-level viewer shares. We replace Skm in equation (3.3) with
∑
allz Skmz ∗SIZEz,where
SIZEz =
Popz∑
k Popk
,and Popz is the number of home-passed in cable market z. SIZEz = 1
for satellite package.
Substituting (3.2)into (3.3), the predicted viewers’ share can be described as follows:
sˆjmt =
∑
j∈k
(
∑
all z
eδjmt+qjtηi
1 +
∑
c in k e
δcmt+qctηi
∗ Skmz ∗ SIZEz) (3.13)
By setting the predicted viewers’ share equal to the observed viewers’ share from Nielsen
data, we can use contraction mapping method, proposed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) and described in detail by Nevo (2000), to get the mean utility from watching chan-
nels: δjmt. At this moment, we don’t estimate the variance of ηi but simply assume that
ηi follows a certain type of non-negative distribution
78. The steps to calculate δjmt can be
described as follows:
1. Prepare random draws of the non-negative individual-specific deviations: ηi.
2. Use the starting values of δoldjmt to calculate sˆjmt.
3. Update the values of δjmt by using δ
new
jmt = δ
old
jmt ∗ sjmtsˆjmt .
4. Exit the estimation if sjmt ≈ sˆjmt.
After the viewers’ mean utility from watching channel j in market m at day t has been
obtained, we are able to estimate the households’ non-price taste parameters, α and β, for
7We try two types distribution of ηi: (1) Modify the distribution Cohen (2008), we use the left truncated
standard normal distribution. (2) Use the squared standard normal distribution. Both distributions can
guarantee non-negative individual-specific deviations. There is no qualitatively different between the results
from these two distributions.
8In the long run, we will adopt more of the BLP-style approach.
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TV channels by using the equation below:
δjmt = Xjmtβ + qjtα+ ζjmt
In this estimation, the advertising units, qjt, may have the problem of endogeneity, that is,
some market specific deviations from mean utility, ζjmt, though not observed, are likely to be
known by the television channels and taken into account when channels set the advertising
units. To overcome this problem, we use the fixed effects of channels and day-of-week. Also,
the interactive dummies of channels and day-of-week are included in the estimation. Since we
assume that the idiosyncratic error term, eiknm, is distributed type I extreme value, we can
estimate the parameters for the bundle characteristics and the price sensitivity parameter
by using the equation:
log(Skm)− log(S0m) = Wkm + Zknmκ− γPknm + ηknm
3.4.2 Estimation of inverse demand for advertisement
Equation (3.8) is used to estimate the aggregate inverse demand for advertising. The
error term, µjt is the unobserved channel and viewer characteristics that affect advertisers’
demand for advertisement, and to have unbiased estimation, there should be no correlation
between µjt and the independent variables. However, television channels might partly ob-
serve these channel and viewer characteristics and the characteristics might affect channels’
decision on advertisement units. Therefore, the advertisement units, qji, might be correlated
with µjt. Since the number of viewers depends on the advertisement units, Vjt might be
correlated with µjt as well. To correct the bias in the estimations of λ and θ, some in-
struments are used. Following Wilbur (2008), we use the observed show characteristics and
non-ad mean utility of the channel as the instruments. The non-ad mean utility is defined as
δ¯jmt − qjtα, where δ¯jmt is the average of the utility from channel j at day t over 46 DMAs.
These instruments enter the equation (3.3) to calculate the percentage of the population
who watch each channel, thus these instruments are correlated with the number of viewers.
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Because of the two-sidedness of television industry where the number of viewers and adver-
tising level are interdependent with each other, advertisement units qjt is also correlated with
these instruments. Therefore the first condition for a feasible instrument, that is, the instru-
ment variables must be correlated with the instrumented variables are satisfied. Next, let’s
discuss the irrelevancy between the instruments and the advertisers’ preference for the un-
observed channel and audience characteristics. Non-ad mean utility is the viewers’ net mean
utility from observed channel characteristics (where viewers’ utility from advertisement is
deducted) and these observed channel characteristics are included as the independent factors
to explain the advertiser preference, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that non-ad mean
utility is independent to the advertiser preference for the unobserved channel and audience
characteristics.
3.5 Estimation results
This section discusses the estimated parameters.
≺ table B.20 
Table B.20 reports the estimation of non-random utility coefficients. The independent
variables include the show characteristics, day-of-week dummies, channel dummies, mar-
ket dummies and the interactive dummies of day-of-week and channel. If we assume that
individual-specific deviations of the preference for advertisement are positive and distributed
standard normal left truncated at zero, α, the maximum disutility from advertisement is
-1.601. Among 2000 simulated individuals, about 90% of αi(= α + ηi) are negative, which
suggests that most of the households dislike advertisement 9.
≺ table B.21 
Table B.21 reports the median of the maximum own-advertising elasticities by channels. The
own-advertising elasticities of audience size are calculated to equal −α ∗ Unit ∗ (1 − sjmt).
9We also conduct the estimation in which we assume that ηi is distributed squared standard normal.
The result is only quantitatively different. α = −3.2 and about 93% of αi is negative.
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All channels are very elastic to advertisement. Among all channels, BET is the most elastic
while NICK is the least. When advertisement increases by 1%, the probability of watching
BET will decrease by about 26.7%, while NICK will decrease by 6.35%.
≺ table B.22 
Table B.22 reports the coefficients of cable service subscription. In this estimation, we
include the monthly fee of each service, cable characteristics dummies and DMA dummies.
In a logit model, the own-price elasticities can be calculated by −αpj(1 − sj). The price
sensitivity parameter is -1.261, which indicates that the average own-price elasticity is -17.51
for Basic cable, -23.26 for Expanded Basic 1, -21.59 for the Expanded Basic 2, and -42.42
for Satellite.
≺ table B.23 
Table B.23 reports the estimates of the inverse demand for advertisement. Variable ”unit” is
the advertising quantity. The sign of the coefficient of unit is negative (though not signicant),
which indicates the higher the advertising level is on a channel, the lower the advertising
price is charged. ”GRP” measures the audience size. The number of viewers places a positive
externality to advertisers. The more viewers a channel has, the higher price this channel
can charge from advertisers.
3.6 Counterfactual estimation
In this section, we describe a numerical simulation aimed to quantifying the likely impact
of an a la carte regulation. We simulate the equilibrium prices for the 10 most popular
channels at the estimated parameters. To do this, we first recover the licnese fee cost that
progamming operators pay to TV networks by assuming that license fees are negotiated by
a upstream and a downstream firm. Second, we use the estimated license fees and marginal
cost to calculate the equilibrium price for each individual channel.
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3.6.1 License fees estimation
License fees are determined via bilateral negotiation of a pair of upstream and down-
stream firms. Each pair of programming operator k and TV network j negotiate over the
license fee to maximize the Nash product. There are extensive studies on bilateral negoti-
ations. Similar to the environments in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Hart and Tirole (1990),
McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Segal and Whinston (2003) where there are more than one
firm in one side of the market, there are two upstreams in our model. The downstream firm
will bargain with each upstream firm (i.e. Comcast-CNN and Comcast-ESPN) separately
and simultaneously. The outcome of Comcast from the negotiation with CNN depends the
outcome of the negotiation between Comcast and ESPN. We assume that each pair take the
outcome from the other pair as given. Each pair of upstream and downstream firms will
choose license fee ri to maximize the Nash product. The Nash product is defined as follows,
NPkj = (Π
Y
k −ΠNk )λ(ΠYj −ΠNj )1−λ
where λ is the downstream firm bargain power. ΠYk and Π
Y
j are the profits of the downstream
and upstream firms when an agreement is reached. ΠNk and Π
N
j are the profits of downstream
and upstream firms when they cannot reach an agreement with channel c. The FOC of the
Nash bargain solution is
∂NPkj
∂rj
= λ(ΠYk −ΠNk )λ−1
∂ΠYdown
∂rj
(ΠYj −ΠNj )1−λ (3.14)
+(1− λ)(ΠYk −ΠNk )λ(ΠYj −ΠNj )−λ(
∂ΠYj
∂rj
− ∂Π
N
j
∂rj
)
We use Chicago as an example. In Chicago, there are 5 cable areas and we assume that
all cable programs are distributed by the same operator. Therefore, the downstream firm’s
profit is equal to the sum of the profits from all cable areas. We assume that the license fee
of one channel is exactly the same no matter this channel is in ”Basic” or ”Expanded Basic”
package. The estimated license fees are reported at table B.24. The unit of the license fees
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in table B.24 is dollar per subscriber. If the programming operator, i.e. Comcast, carrys
AEN in either package, Comcast needs to pay AEN about $0.095 per subscriber.
We only have data of 29 channels and don’t have the carriage information of other channels,
therefore, we are not able to recover the license fees for the other channels. Besides license
fees, programming operators may have other operation costs, e.g. installation fee etc, which
cannot be estimated as well. We estimated an aggregate marginal cost for each cable market
to measure all other costs for programming operators. The marginal costs are reported at
table B.25.
≺ table B.25 
3.6.2 A la carte prices estimation
In the counterfactual estimation, we still use Chicago as a sample market to estimate
the a la carte price offers. Due to the computational complication, we currently are unable
to estimated the a la carte offers for all 29 channels. Instead, we will estimate the prices
for the 10 most often-seen channels. These 10 channels are: ESPN, FX, FXNC, HIST,
LIF, NICK, SPK, TBSC, TNT, and USA. In current version of the estimation, there are
two assumptions: First, we assume that license fees remain unchanged with an a la carte
regulation. Second, we assume that the advertising levels are unchanged with an a la carte
regulation.
In the counterfactual estimation, we assume that there is a cable TV provider and a satellite
TV provider. Each household has three choices: buy the cable “bundle” (the set of channels)
that they most prefer (conditional upon buying cable), buy the satellite “bundle” they most
prefer (conditional upon buying satellite), or buy nothing. Households have deviation in
the preference to advertisement (we have 2000 random draws that are assumed to be the
absolute value of standard normal distribution). This will allow us to catch the heterogene-
ity of viewers so that households may prefer different combinations of channels. For each
household, we can calculate the utility they receive from each combination of packages and
subtract the disutility from price. Let’s use three channels (A,B,C) as examples to describe
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household decision. Both satellite and cable offer the same three channels. Taking the prices
offered by cable and satellite as given, the basic steps of household decision are:
1. Start with cable (given prices and the preference for advertisement), derive the deter-
ministic utility from the 7 possible choices (A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, ABC).
2. Assume that houldhold #1 “selects” the combination of channels that yields the high-
est utility. Let us call this “preferred cable combination”.
3. Repeat these steps for satellite. Let us call this “preferred satellite combination”.
4. The end result of steps 1 – 3 is that household #1 has two choices (plus the outside
option): the preferred cable combination and the preferred satellite combination.
5. Add in a logit error and calculate the probability of purchasing the preferred cable
combination, the preferred satellite combination, and the outside option.
6. Move on to household #2 and repeat steps 1 – 5.
7. Taking the averages of the 2,000 households yields market shares for all channels (and
combinations of channels).
Then cable and satellite choose the prices to maximize their profit.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we set up a structural model to test the impact of an a la carte regulation
in the cable TV industry. To do this, we empirically estimate viewers’ preference param-
eters, which give us viewers’ dollar valuation for individual channels. We formally model
household decision (regarding television-watching and cable package choices), cable operator
pricing decisions and television channel advertisement pricing decisions. In the estimation of
household television-watching decisions, we explicitly incorporate advertising in the utility
function and find that advertising levels bring negative utility to most of the consumers. We
also estimate the inverse demand for advertising on TV channels. Finally, we conduct a full
counterfactual simulation to examine how an a la carte regulation will affect the industry.
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Appendix A. Proof of Chapter 1
A.1 Equilibria in one-sided market
A.1.1 Mixed bundling (denoted as OMB)
Viewers’ demand functions are given by,
dOMBB = V − pMBB
dOMBa = 1− pMBa
dOMBb = 1− pMBb
Cable operator’s profits is given by,
pOMB = dOMBB ∗ pOMBB + dOMBa ∗ pOMBa + dOMBb ∗ pOMBb
Take derivative w.r.t pOMBB , p
OMB
a , p
OMB
b and solve the FOCs, we have,
pOMBB =
V
2
pOMBa =
1
2
pOMBb =
1
2
Substitute prices into profit function, cable operator’s profit is given by,
piOMB =
V 3
4
+
1
2
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Note that in mixed bundling, we must have pMBB = p
MB
a + p
MB
b , which indicates,
V ≤ 2
A.1.2 Pure bundling
All types of viewers are served (denoted as OPB)
The demand functions are given by,
dOPBB = V − pOPBB
dOPBa = 1− pOPBB
dOPBb = 1− pOPBB
Cable operator’s profits are given by,
piOPB = (dOPBB + d
OPB
a + d
OPB
b ) ∗ pOPBB
Take derivative w.r.t pPBB and solve the FOC, we have,
pOPBB =
1
6
V +
1
3
Therefore, cable operator’s profit are given by,
piOPB = 112 (V + 2)
2
Only high type of viewers are served (denoted as OPH)
The demand functions are given by,
dOPHB = V − pOPBB
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Cable operator’s profits are given by,
pOPH = dOPHB ∗ pOPHB
Take derivative w.r.t pPBB and solve the FOC, we have,
pOPHB = (1/2)V
Therefore, cable operator’s profit are given by,
piOPH = (1/4)V 2
A.1.3 No bundling
All three types of viewers are served (denoted as ONB)
The demand functions are respectively given by,
dONBB = V − pONBa − pONBb
dONBa = 1− pONBa
dONBb = 1− pONBb
Cable operator’s profit is given by,
pONB = (dONBB + d
ONB
a ) ∗ pONBa + (dONBB + dONBb ) ∗ pONBb
Take derivative w.r.t pNBa , p
NB
b and solve the FOCs, we have,
pONBa =
1
6
(V + 1)
pONBb =
1
6
(V + 1)
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Cable operator’s profit is given by,
piONB =
1
6
(V + 1)2
Only multiple demand type of viewers are served (denoted as ONH)
In this subgame, if we assume that two networks are symmetric to cable operator, this
subgame is exactly the same as the subgame where cable operator offers only price for
bundle and serves only the multiple demand type viewer. The cable operator will set the
stand alone prices at pNHa + p
NH
b = P
PH
B .
A.2 Comparison of cable operator’s profit
Cable operator’s profits under different subgame are given by,
piOMB =
V 2
4
+
1
2
piOPB =
1
12
(V + 2)2
piOPH =
1
4
V 2
piONB =
1
6
(V + 1)
It is easy to see that strategies OPB, OPH and ONB are weakly dominated by OMB, which
means in the existing range of OMB , [1, 2], cable operator will choose mixed bundling
pricing strategy. When V <
√
2, we have pOPB > pONB , and when V < 2 +
√
6, we have
pONB > pOPH . Therefore, when 2 < V ≤ 2 + √6, cable operator chooses no bundling
strategy serving all three groups viewers, and when V > 2 +
√
6, cable operator will choose
to serve only multiple demand group of viewers either by offering a price for bundle or by
offer prices for each network.
75
A.3 Equilibria in two-sided market
A.3.1 Mixed bundling (denoted as MB)
In viewers part, the respective demand functions are given by,
dMBB = V − tαMBa − tαMBb − pMBB
dMBa = 1− tαMBa − pMBa
dMBb = 1− tαMBb − pMBb
Cable operator’s profits are given by,
pMB = dMBB ∗ pMBB + dMBa ∗ pMBa + dMBb ∗ pMBb
Take derivative w.r.t pMBB , p
MB
a , p
MB
b and solve the FOCs, we have,
pMBB =
V − tαMBa − tαMBb
2
(A.1)
pMBa =
1− tαMBa
2
pMBb =
1− tαMBb
2
Substitute into the demand functions, we can derive viewers’ demands as functions of ad-
vertising levels,
dMBB =
1
2
V − 1
2
tαPBa −
1
2
tαPBb (A.2)
dMBa =
1
2
V − 1
2
tαPBa
dMBb =
1
2
V − 1
2
tαPBb
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TV networks’ implicit demand functions are given by (assuming that TV networks are
independent to advertisers),
aMBa = (d
MB
B + d
MB
a )− gMBa
aMBb = (d
MB
B + d
MB
b )− gMBb
Substitute dMBB and d
MB
a into the implicit demand functions, we can solve for the explicit
demand functions for advertisement,
αMBa =
2V + 2 + t− 4ga + tV − 4tga + 2tgb
3t2 + 8t+ 4
(A.3)
αMBb =
2V + 2 + t− 4gb + tV − 4tgb + 2tga
3t2 + 8t+ 4
Solve for gMBa and g
MB
b ,
gMBa =
(1 + V )(t+ 2)
2(3t+ 4)
gMBb =
(1 + V )(t+ 2)
2(3t+ 4)
The SPNE is given by,
αMBa = α
MB
b =
2(1 + t)(1 + V )
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
pMBa = p
MB
b = −
−7t2 + 2t2V − 16t+ 2tV − 8
2(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
pMBB =
5t2V − 4t2 + 14tV − 4t+ 8V
2(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
Cable operator’s profits are given by,
pMB =
1
4(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
(114t4 + 33t4V 2 − 96t4V − 336t3V + 156t3V 2 + 480t3 + 284t2V 2
+752t2 − 368t2V − 128tV + 224tV 2 + 512t+ 128 + 64V 2
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TV networks’ profits are given by,
ϕMBa = ϕ
MB
b =
(t+ 2)(1 + V )2(1 + t)
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)2
Consumer surplus is given by,
CSMB =
1
8(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
(−96V t4 + 33V 2t4 + 114t4 − 336V t3 + 156V 2t3 + 480t3 + 752t2
+284t2V 2 − 368t2V + 512t− 128tV + 224tV 2 + 128 + 64V 2)
Note that in mixed bundling, we must have pMBa = p
MB
B = p
MB
a + p
MB
b , which indicates,
11t2 + 20t+ 8
7t2 + 16t+ 8
≤ V ≤ a = 2 (A.4)
A.3.2 Pure bundling (All types viewers are served denoted as PB)
The demand functions are given by,
dPBB = V − tαPBa − tαPBb − pPBB
dPBa = 1− tαPBa − pPBB
dPBb = 1− tαPBb − pPBB
Cable operator’s profits are given by,
pPB = (dPBB + d
PB
a + d
PB
b ) ∗ pPBB
Take derivative w.r.t pPBB and solve the FOC, we have,
pPBB =
1
6
V − 1
3
tαPBa −
1
3
tαPBb +
1
3
(A.5)
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Substitute into demand functions, we can derive viewers’ demands as functions of advertising
level,
dPBB =
5
6
V − 2
3
tαMBa −
2
3
tαMBb −
1
3
(A.6)
dPBa =
2
3
− 2
3
tαMBa +
1
3
tαMBb −
1
6
V
dPBb =
2
3
− 2
3
tαMBb +
1
3
tαMBa −
1
6
V
TV networks’ demand functions are given by (assuming that TV networks are indepen-
dent to advertisers),
αPBa = (d
PB
B + d
PB
a )− gPBa
αPBb = (d
PB
B + d
PB
b )− gPBb
Substitute dPBa , d
PB
b and d
PB
B into the implicit demand functions, we can solve for the
explicit demand functions for advertisement,
αPBa =
1 + 2tV − 4tga + tgb + 2V − 3ga + t
5t2 + 8t+ 3
αPBb =
1 + 2tV − 4tgb + tga + 2V − 3gb + t
5t2 + 8t+ 3
Solve for gPBa and g
PB
b ,
gPBa =
(2V + 1)(t+ 1)
6 + 7t
gPBb =
(2V + 1)(t+ 1)
6 + 7t
The optimal advertisement levels and subscription fee in this sub-game are given by,
αPBa = α
PB
b =
(2V + 1)(4t+ 3)
(5t+ 3)(6 + 7t)
pPBB =
18t2 + t2V + 30t+ 9tV + 6V + 12
2(5t+ 3)(6 + 7t)
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Cable operator’s profits in this equilibrium are given by,
piPB =
3(18t2 + t2V + 30t+ 9tV + 6V + 12)2
4(5t+ 3)2(6 + 7t)2
TV networks’ profits are given by,
ϕPBa = ϕ
PB
b =
(2V + 1)2(t+ 1)(4t+ 3)
(5t+ 3)(6 + 7t)2
Consumers surplus is given by,
CSPB =
3
8(5t+ 3)2(6 + 7t)2
(−1836t4V + 1676t4 + 649t4V 2 − 5328V t3 + 2178t3V 2 + 4824t3
+2757t2V 2 + 5172t2 − 5652t2V − 2592tV + 1548tV 2 + 2448t+ 432− 432V + 324V 2)
To ensure that all three types of viewers are served, we must have the demand in small
demand type to be non-negative, which indicates,
dPBi = 1− taPBi − pPBB > 0⇐⇒ V < b =
2(12 + 22t2 + 33t)
17t2 + 21t+ 6
(A.7)
b > 2 for all t > 0.
A.3.3 No bundling (All types are served denoted as NB)
In viewers part, the demand functions are respectively given by,
dNBB = V − tαNBa − tαNBb − pNBa − pNBb
dNBa = 1− tαNBa − pNBa
dNBb = 1− tαNBb − pNBb
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Cable operator’s profits are given by,
piNB = (dNBB + d
NB
a ) ∗ pNBa + (dNBB + dNBb ) ∗ pNBb
Take derivative w.r.t pNBa , p
NB
b and solve the FOCs, we have,
pNBa =
1
6
V − 1
2
tαNBa +
1
6
pNBb =
1
6
V − 1
2
tαNBb +
1
6
TV networks’ demand functions are given by (assuming that TV networks are independent
to advertisers),
αNBa = (d
NB
B + d
NB
a )− gNBa
αNBb = (d
NB
B + d
NB
b )− gNBb
Solve for gNBa and g
NB
b ,
gNBa =
(1 + V )(2 + t)
2(3t+ 4)
gNBb =
(1 + V )(2 + t)
2(3t+ 4)
The optimal advertisement levels and subscription fee in this sub-game are given by,
αNBa = α
NB
b =
2(1 + V )(t+ 1)
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
pNBa = p
NB
b =
(3t2 + 12t+ 8)(1 + V )
6(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)
Cable operator’s profits are given by,
piNB =
(3t2 + 12t+ 8)2(1 + V )2
6(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
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TV networks’ profits are given by,
ϕNBa = ϕ
NB
b =
(2 + t)(1 + V )2(t+ 1)
(3t+ 2)(3t+ 4)2
Consumer surplus is given by,
CSNB =
1
4(3t+ 2)2(3t+ 4)2
(57t4V 2 − 210V t4 + 219t4 + 888t3 + 240t3V 2 − 816V t3 − 1120t2V
+376t2V 2 + 1312t2 + 256tV 2 − 640tV + 832t+ 64V 2 − 128V + 192)
To ensure that all three types viewers are served, we must have the demand in small demand
type to be non-negative, which indicates,
dNBi = 1− tαNBi − pNBi ≥ 0⇐⇒ V ≤ d =
39t2 + 84t+ 40
15t2 + 24t+ 8
(A.8)
Note that d > 2 for all t > 0.
A.3.4 Comparison of candidate equilibria
pMB − pNB = (V − 2)2/12, which indicates that NB is a weakly dominated strategy to
MB for the downstream monopolist, therefore, when V = 2, we will have two equilibria, MB
equilibrium and PB equilibrium. Note that when V = V1, we have p
MB = pPB ,where V1 is
given as follows,
V1 = (1103120t
5 + 69120t+ 31587t8 + 658577t6 + 6912 + 743760t3 + 220656t7 + 300960t2
+1138620t4 + 2t(6 + 7t)(4 + 3t)(5t+ 3)(324t5 + 1845t4 + 3876t3 + 3878t2 + 1884t+ 360)
1
2
(3t+ 2)
3
2 /(294336t2 + 697440t3 + 69120t+ 904204t5 + 495367t6 + 151782t7 + 20091t8
+1005836t4 + 6912)
It is easy to see that V1 >
11t2+20t+8
7t2+16t+8 for all t and V1 ≤ 2 iff t ≤ 2.3.Therefore, if t ≤ 2.3, when
2 ≥ V ≥ V 1, we have mixed bundling equilibrium. If t > 2.3, mixed bundling equilibrium
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does not exist.
A.4 Discussion of how ga affects αa in both PB and MB subgames
Take partial derivative of αa with respect to ga in (1.3) and (1.4),
∂αa
∂ga
=
∂Da
∂aa
∂αa
∂ga
+
∂Da
∂αb
∂αb
∂ga
− 1 (A.9)
Where ∂αb∂ga can be get from network b’s demand function for advertisement.
∂αb
∂ga
=
∂Db
∂αa
∗ ∂aa
∂ga
+
∂Db
∂αb
∗ ∂αb
∂ga
⇒ (A.10)
∂αb
∂ga
=
∂Db
∂αa
∗ ∂αa∂ga
1− ∂Db∂αb
.
Solve for ∂aa∂ga , we have
∂αa
∂ga
= 1
1− ∂Da∂αa −
∂Da
∂αb
∗ ∂Db
∂αa
1− ∂Db
∂αb
.
There are three effects on the demand for advertisements. The last component of the
equation (A.9) reflects the direct effect. When advertisement fee increases by 1 unit, the
advertisement level will decrease by 1 unit. The direct effect is the same in both PB and
MB subgames. The other two components of (A.9) reflect the indirect effects of advertising
fee through the number of viewers Da on the demand for advertisement. The first indirect
effect is via the network’s own advertising level, ∂Da∂αa
∂αa
∂ga
. When advertising fee increases, it
will cause a lower advertising level directly, which further to increase the total viewers and in
turn a higher demand for advertisement. As we discuss in section 1.4.1, this effect weakens
the direct effect and makes the advertising level decrease slowly. The effect of advertising
level on the number of viewers of the same network is more significant in MB.
The second indirect effect is via the advertising level of the network’s competing rival. When
channel a increases its advertising fee, it will affect its rival’s advertising level and then the
total number of viewers. The key question over here is how the advertising fee would affect its
rival’s advertising level. We answer this by taking the partial derivative of ab with respect
to ga. From equation (A.10), we know that there are two sources on how the change of
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advertising fee on network a affects the advertising level on network b. The first and main
source is when ga goes up, the network a’s own advertising level goes down and then the
rival’s total number of viewers increase (because it can attract more the overlapping viewers
from multiple demand group) which will raise the advertising level on network b. However,
when αb goes up, it will lower Db and affect the demand of advertisement on network b in the
opposite direction, which will partially offset the effect from the first source. Overall, when
ga increases, αb will also increase, and higher advertising level on network b will decrease
the number of viewers on network a. Therefore, the second indirect effect will decrease the
demand for advertisement, that is, it help to make the αa decrease faster as ga increases.
The second effect is more significant in MB subgame than PB subgame. There are two
reasons. First, the cross effect of the advertising level on the other network is stronger in
MB subgame than PB subgame. When there is 1 unit decrease in αa it will increase Db by
t
2 in MB subgame, while only
t
3 in PB subgame equations ((1.1) and (1.2)). The reason is:
when αa decrease, in MB subgame demands for groups B and a increase such that p
MB
a and
pMBB increase by
t
2 . As the result, D
MB
b increases by
t
2 because of a increase of the viewers
in group B. However, in PB subgame, the decrease of αa will increase p
PB
B by
t
3 , thus the
served viewers in group B will increase by frac 2t3, while the served viewers in group b will
decrease by t3 , and the total viewers of network b increase by
t
3 . Second, as we discussed
in the previous paragraph, when αb increases as ga increases, it will continue to lower the
viewers on network b, Db, which will partially offset and weaken the demand decreasing
from the first source. The offsetting effect is more significant in PB subgame, it is because
the effect of advertising level on the number of viewers of the same network is stronger in
PB. When αb increases by 1 unit, the Db will decrease by more in PB. Overall, when αa
increases by 1 unit, Db will increase by more in MB subgame and thus αb will increase more
in the MB subgame than PB subgame. Again, because of the stronger cross effect of the
advertising level on the other network in MB subgame, the number of viewers of network a
will decrease by more in MB subgame than in PB subgame.
Therefore, combining all three effects, we have:
∂αMBa
∂gMBa
= 1
1− ∂Da∂αa −
∂Da
∂αb
∗ ∂Db
∂αa
1− ∂Db
∂αb
= 1+t
(1+ 3t2 )(1+
t
2 )
.
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We know that when advertising fee increases, the advertising level of the same network will
decreases faster in MB subgame than in PB subgame.
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Appendix B. Tables
Table B.1: No upstream firm, µi = 30 (big market)
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Table B.2: No upstream firm, µi = 10 (small market)
Table B.3: With advertisement, µi = 30, t&n = 1
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Table B.4: With advertisement, µi = 30, t&n = 10
Table B.5: With license fee, µi = 30
Table B.6: With license fee, µi = 15
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Table B.7: Comparison of elasticity under no bundling when license fee is fixed at the level
of pure bundling
Table B.8: With advertisement and license fee, µi = 30, t&n = 1
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Table B.9: With advertisement and license fee, µi = 30, t&n = 5
Table B.10: With advertisement and license fee,µi = 30, t = 1, n = 5
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Table B.11: With advertisement and license fee,µi = 30, t = 3, n = 1
Table B.12: Welfare comparison (no upstream)
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Table B.13: Welfare comparison (with ad), t&n = 1
Table B.14: Welfare comparison (with ad), t&n = 10
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Table B.15: Welfare comparison(with ad and license fee), t&n = 1
Table B.16: Welfare comparison(with ad and license fee), t&n = 5
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Table B.17: Sample statistics: television programming service data
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Table B.18: Sample statistics: rating
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Table B.19: Sample statistics: advertisement data
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Table B.20: Non-random utility parameter estimates
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Table B.21: Median of the maximum own advertisement elasticity of audience size
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Table B.22: Cable service subscription parameter estimates
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Table B.23: Inverse demand for ads. parameter estimates
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Table B.24: License fees
Table B.25: Marginal costs
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Appendix C. Figures and Graphics
Figure C.1: Description of Model
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Figure C.2: Subscription Fees in the Equilibria
Figure C.3: Number of Viewers in the Equilibria
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Figure C.4: Advertising Fees in the Equilibria
Figure C.5: Advertising Levels in the Equilibria
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Figure C.6: Consumer Surplus in the Equilibria
Figure C.7: Number of Viewers Comparison
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Figure C.8: Ads Levels Comparison
Figure C.9: Consumer Surplus Comparison
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Figure C.10: Bundle Flattens Demand
Figure C.11: Demand under No Bundling
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Figure C.12: Demand under Pure Bundling
Figure C.13: Demand under Mixed Bundling
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Figure C.14: Demand under NB when c is fixed at the Level of PB
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